Showing posts with label # MONUSCO Video Unit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label # MONUSCO Video Unit. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

TED'S DIGITAL JUNGLE #33: CONGO MISSION END REPORT, CHAPTER 6



2.4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MONUSCO VIDEO UNIT:

These items are based on written recommendations developed with my MDP coach after the MDP IN 2011. I submitted most of them to former Director PID George Ola-Davies, and they were all ignored. However, I am convinced that they all remain viable and relevant.

  • KENNEDY SOP FOR VIDEO UNIT REGION EAST SHOULD BE RE-INSTITUTED
  • DIRECTOR PID SHOULD HAVE MONTHLY EDITORIAL MEETINGS WITH CHIEF, VIDEO
  • SHARING OF REPORTERS WITH RADIO OKAPI SHOULD BE ENABLED
  • FUNDS FOR A DEDICATED LINE FOR FTP SHOULD BE RELEASED BY PID
  • VIDEO CHIEF SHOULD BE IN LOOP FOR ALL VIDEO RECRUITMENT


2.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DPKO/DFS AND OTHER MISSIONS:

THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE :

While most pundits and media experts recognize we live in a Digital Age, and are in the midst of a Digital Revolution which is changing our lives in more ways than we can be aware of, the United Nations remains mired in the Age of Print, almost a century behind the modern world.

Since the UN is, as noted elsewhere, a political organization, this emphasis on print and words is understandable. After all, nations have gone to war over differing interpretations of words in treaties. However, this focus on words makes the UN often blind to the power of images, and keeps the UN way behind the curve when it comes to contemporary multimedia communications. In DPKO missions I am familiar with , the Spokesperson sometimes doubles as Director. P.I.D. and this  has resulted in a PID stunted by a regressive emphasis on what I call the UN damage-control school of Public Information. The main tenet of the damage-control school is that all criticisms , no matter how inane, must be rebutted,; corollary #2 is that  the worst thing one can do is to make a mistake, and that, therefore, all texts need to be thoroughly vetted and revised, as  often as needed.

In terms of video, this means the safest way to deal with any subject is to: a) Have a thoroughly vetted narration; or b): to show a VIP soundbite, since the VIP can then take the blame if something goes wrong – and he or she will be happy to be seen on camera, which is money in the bank for the Director, P.I.D.

However, regardless of political leanings, successful professional practitioners of propaganda and mass marketing from Josef Goebbels to Gene Lakoff are in complete agreement that images are far more powerful than words, and the billions upon billions of dollars spent on corporate branding  and political campaigns are tangible proof: a picture is worth a thousand words, and that therefore images, not words, are the way to people’s hearts, and that, above all, one should never be boring.

In direct contrast, the deadly secret of the UN damage -control school of Public Information is that being boring is not necessarily such a bad thing, just so long as the boss is happy. Indeed, if the program is boring, fewer people will watch it and there is less of a chance something can go wrong.  And, as I experienced first hand working with SG Kurt Waldheim, who is going to tell the  boss he is boring? \

People who understand communications are first and foremost good listeners and good managers, ready to understand their intended audience and to seek ways to touch their hearts.
Directors of P.I.D, first and foremost, need to be acquainted with modern communications theory.
It also helps if they have some knowledge of media production management, as well as experience in managing the creative talent actually doing the work on the ground.

 Since good spokespersons are primarily performers who can deftly articulate the party Line, they are rarely also good listeners or innovative managers. Accordingly, the Spokesperson and the Director PID should be different people, if at all possible, since there are very few individuals possessing both the ability to be a good performer and a good listener.


PART III: PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

Personally, as a film and video producer with several decades of international experience both inside and outside the United Nations system, I found my experience as Chief, Video Unit to be both rewarding and fulfilling. To be sure, there were challenges, but this is normal in every professional situation. What was most meaningful to me was that I was given the opportunity to do some quality work – work that I am proud of, and that should be useful to my colleagues in future peacekeeping missions.

In this regard, the genesis of our signature program, MONUC REALITES, is a good example. When we created MONUC REALITES in 2008, we were under intense indirect pressure from Kevin Kennedy to create something modern and up-to-date that would promote the mission mandate to the Congolese population. We knew that we had to produce something radically different from LA SEMAINE EN BREF, but we had to navigate our way through a series of false starts before we got it right.

For example, SRSG Doss was in love with speed, and wanted everything to be as real-time as possible.
He was oblivious to the fact that we were in a country where everything ran late, and where the technical infrastructure was a few decades behind the Western world. For example, shortly after he arrived, he demanded a live telecast of his first Town Hall meeting broadcast to all the sectors – an order so far-fetched that we could only shake our heads in amazement. Eventually, CITS , afraid to tell him that what he was asking was completely impossible, foolishly tried to compromise with a live audio transmission to the sectors that was a complete disaster . The feedback from the speakers was so loud that every word was unintelligible across the country, the sole exception being our Video audio feed coming from our
ace sound engineer Georges Dominique’s lapel microphone.

So, when it came to our new program, SRSG Doss initially wanted a daily video response to some item in the DRC news that had irked him, and, incredibly enough, he wanted that response embedded in the local DRC news shows. This proved to be a non-starter when the Congolese TV stations simply refused to allow it. This was a blessing, because we longed to do a real program, rather knee-jerk reactions. It was also my feeling that many of the wild accusations about us in the DRC media were best ignored, and the dignifying them with a response would give them more credibility than they deserved

Both my senior video producer Carlo Ontal and I agreed that a pro-active approach showing Congolese inter-acting with MONUC staff in the field would be far more interesting television, and far more effective.
Fortunately, Kevin Kennedy had the same mind-set, though he also wanted a news segment with up-to-date MONUC news from the weekly press conference and other sources.

After several demos, we managed to create a video magazine format that combined both a news segment and a feature story – with the news story the lead, but a vignette intro at the top as a tease for the feature story. The thinking behind this was simple. We expected the audience to be intrigued by the feature story, but we also wanted them to watch the news items, so they had to see the news before they could see the feature story.




I first learned this trick years ago when I was in India studying the Indian film industry. The Films Divison of the Indian government was the world’s largest producer of informational films at the time, and they forced all commercial movie theatres to show  (and pay for!) their films as shorts prior to the main feature.
The Indian Institute of Mass Communications did studies on the Films Division products, and, much to their dismay, they found that it was difficult indeed to get people to watch the films unless they were sandwiched between popular commercial features.

We then had to find a way to generate feature stories on a regular basis so we would never run dry.
The newly created Video Unit Region East ,led by producer Carlo Ontal, and editor Titus Nyukuri, was given the task of shooting feature stories around the East, while Kinshasa-based director Alan Brain would shoot material around the West. Every month, Carlo would come up with story ideas that we would fine  tune in conference calls with Kevin Kennedy, and then he would go on the road with Titus and our reporter Horeb Bulambo and shoot 3 or 4 stories per trip. Titus would do a rough cut in the field, and then send the stories to Kinshasa by hand, as described previously.

Meanwhile, our national staff cameraman Serge Kasanga and Daniel Wangisha would cover news stories in the field and in Goma and Kinshasa as needed. Back in Kinshasa, every Monday, head writer Ado Abdou would finish a script and send it to me. I would do a rewrite, and send to the Director for approval, and then send it to the Presenter on Tuesday night. We would then shoot the presentation on Wednesday, and editors Meriton Ahmeti and Kevin Jordan would finish the program on Thursday afternoon so I could then submit it for final approval by the Director, so we could distribute to the TV stations by the weekend.

With this workflow, we were able to produce over 120 programs between 2008- 2010, barely ever missing a week, and maintaining a consistency of quality. In this regard, special credit must go to our brilliant graphic designer Meriton Ahmeti, who gave the show a production value that was unlike anything the Congolese had ever seen, and therefore aroused great visual interest.  The Congolese TV stations paid us the supreme compliment of showing the program in prime time without charging an extra fee, and we received direct accolades from both Information Minister Lambert Mende and First Lady Olive Lembe Kabila, and we never had a complaint of any kind from our target audience, the Congolese .

Our only detractors consisted of the Spokesperson and his cronies, for reasons known only to them.

As far as I am concerned, MONUC REALITES was a mission well accomplished, and I am very proud to have been part of this team effort. It is my sincere hope that this program serves as a point of departure for future video programs by other DPKO missions.  For the immediate future, I shall be writing a doctoral thesis on digital documentary for Sweden’s University of Lund, and my old school, Fashion Institute of Technology in New York, has offered a position in 2013 in their newly created Film Department as a Professor of Documentary Film.

I feel indeed fortunate to have been given the opportunity to work on Peacekeeping missions, and I am open to the possibility of a consultancy in the future., though preferably not with MONUSCO, for  reasons which will become evident in Part IV,  Come what may, I shall always be more than happy to share my experiences and whatever I have learned with DPKO colleagues in the future.  For me, this has been both an honor and a privilege.
I



Saturday, January 16, 2016

TED'S DIGITAL JUNGLE #30: CONGO MISSION END REPORT, CHAPTER 3

March, 2010:  There were many rumors regarding Kevin’s successor, but most of us were surprised to see the late Olamide Adedeji become Acting Director in early 2010. Former HO in Bunia, Ms. Adedeji was a charming and very literate woman who told us she had been asked by Mr. Doss to run PID until a new director could be found. She freely admitted she had no background in communications, and would be reliant upon us as communications professionals. As weeks became months, this proved to be a very  difficult arrangement as Ms. Adedeji in reality had the Spokesperson, Madnodgje Mounoubai  giving us orders. When he began to attack MONUC REALITES in meetings, I objected, pointing out he was the same rank as I was, and was certainly not my supervisor.

We did do a special for The 50 th Anniversary of DRC Independence titled L’ONU ET LA RDC – 50 ANS DE PARTENARIAT, intended to introduce MONUSCO and the Country Team to the Congolese, and produced versions in 5 local languages, True to her word, Olamide let us in Video carry on the work we had started with Kevin Kennedy, but the stress of the job combined with her own poor health proved catastrophic. Olamide suddenly passed away in August of 2010, leaving behind an understandably traumatized but also a very divided PID.  I shall elaborate in a further section.

September, 2010- October, 2010: Deputy Director Madnodge Mounoubai, the Spokesperson, became OIC, and immediately asserted his authority, shouting down anyone who refused to toe the line in PID Meetings., such as when I  dared to ask if we might discuss PID strategy. Instead, he gave us a mysterious document written by an unknown Anglophone which presented a reactive, damage control approach completely at odds with the approach advocated by SRSG Roger Meece in his first meeting with us.  At that time, I seriously considered resigning. Life is too short to work with abusive idiots. However, a new director suddenly materialized.

 November, 2010 – 24 December, 2011 : When George Ola-Davies became Director PID in November of 2010, he met with Video Unit and made us many promises, saying, “ Give me 6 months!” and we gave him our full support. Unfortunately, by the time of his departure on Christmas Eve, 2011, he had broken most of them.

During his tenure, we had no communications strategy, no work plan, no editorial meetings, no internal communications, no transparency, and no respect for chain of command or previously established SOP. As journalist Fawaz Gerges said of Moammar Qaddaf:“ He destroyed all state institutions and replaced them with a cult of personality.” The same might be said of Mr. Ola-Davies, who signed his internal emails  “god” and who seemed to have such faith in his supreme judgement and ability that he never had to listen to mere mortal professionals like the rest of us.

 The ensuing chaos created a division run on his whim, and when he did not get his way, he turned mean and personal.  One of the casualties was our flagship MONUSCO REALITES, which died when Mr. Ola-Davies’ friends in Budget suddenly decided we could not hire freelance Congolese talent as reporters,. Over two years, we had done over 100 episodes, Now, suddenly without support for reporters, as well as without support for travel to cover MONUSCO activities on the frontlines, we were forced to create a new program on short notice. The result, ONU NEWS, was a glossy, Fox News- style program featuring our excellent cadre of presenters from Radio Okapi covering more or less the same VIP soundbites we had been covering with LA SEMAINE EN BREF.  In short, the same tired old steak with a new sauce.

The big event during this period was the disastrous Presidential election, described by a WASHINGTON POST editorial page as a “ political failure.’ PID’s contribution to these elections was to provide unconditional support to the CENI, a position I found both ethically dubious, and aesthetically appalling.

Rather than trying to set a positive example with quality product, Video Unit was ordered to serve as a production entity for scripts written entirely by the CENI without any input by us- with predictably lamentable results. However, Mr. Ola-Davies reign was inexplicably cut short in the weeks after the elections, and he mysteriously vanished on 24 December, 2011.

24 December, 2011- 21 January,2012 : As senior professional at the time of Mr. Ola-Davies’ exit, I was appointed OIC by COS Ola Almgren . The post electoral period proved particularly sensitive, as many Congolese accused us of helping the government run what had been an obviously rigged election. The challenge was  to explain that, while  nearly all international observer agreed that the elections had not been credible our mandate explicitly limited our role to one of logistical support .

The Congolese Governement  did us no favors by suggesting  that MONUSCO had actively participated in every aspect of the elections, thereby giivng them some credibility. Under these conditions, I arranged for a Radio Okapi interview with DSRSG Leila Zerrougui to explain the MONUSCO Mandate as it pertained to the elections, and Madame Zerrougui was superb, clearly explaining what our job was, and what it was not. I then had the interview translated into all the national languages and distributed around the country by our Outreach Unit.  Madame Zerrougui was well aware that we did not want to be in the position of defending the elections themselves, thereby defending the indefensible., which would have made matters even worse,All we could do was hope that the moment would pass, and that public attention would return to the bulwark of our mandate, which was Protection of Civilians.  As my tenure as OIC /PID was coming to an end, we were expecting the arrival of yet another new Director PID.