DOCUMENTARY IN THE AGE OF NEW MEDIA: CHAPTER 5 TWEAKED

CHAPTER V.  CASE STUDY #2: THE MONUSCO VIDEO UNIT

           “The UN first started intervening in Congo some 55 years ago, and then-Secretary

              General Dag Hammarskjöld died while trying to deal with the crisis that was afflicting

              that country, so it’s been an on-going thing. But for us now, the heart of the matter

              has been the massive suffering of the population… As you know, over the past 15

              years, protection of civilians has been at the heart of what we are asked to do…”

                         Head of UN Peacekeeping Undersecretary General Herve Ladsous [1]

                                              

V.1. Introduction

     This is the second Case Study of an example of Institutional Documentary, with the subject being The MONUSCO Video Unit, the Video Unit of The United Nations Stabilization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, (MONUSCO) in the 5-year period from December, 2007, to July 2012, when the author was Chief, MONUSCO Video Unit.

     According to Stanley Meisler, author of A History of the United Nations:

   ” The United Nations has no more important work than peacekeeping. In its first forty years,

     the Security Council authorized only thirteen peacekeeping operations. In the fifth decade,

     another twenty were launched…As of December, 1994, the U.N. operated seventeen

     peacekeeping missions with seventy- three thousand troops and police at an annual cost of

    $3.6 billion – more than three times the cost of the regular $1 billion U.N. budget covering

    all other activities…”[2]

     Today, there are 13 UN Peacekeeping missions around the world, with about 110,000 military, police and civilian staff. All fall under the supervision of the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, including supervision of all Departments of Public Information of the various missions around the world.

         As a result, media units on Peacekeeping Missions like the MONUSCO Video are technically independent entities under the direct supervision of the Departments of Public Information of the Peacekeeping Missions. This is essential to understand, because while the strategic communications goals of UN Peacekeeping missions might appear to be simply projecting a positive image of the UN Peacekeeping mission itself and its activities to the local populations being served, the communications task itself is far more complex.

      If a UNTV production makes a political mistake, the worst-case scenario might be a political embarrassment – and political embarrassments can usually be swept under the carpet and forgotten. However, in a UN Peacekeeping mission in a borderline failed state, a simple communications problem can have lethal consequences. With the 13 peacekeeping missions currently around the world  employing nearly 100,00-soldiers, police and civilians at an annual cost now of $6.5 billion, one might think that the importance of media production in UN Peacekeeping missions would be recognized as an essential part of an overall plan designed to win the hearts and minds of the local populations. However, this has not always been the case. In 1999, Ingrid Lehman, a communications professional with over two decades experience working for the UN and DPKO, wrote what remains today the definitive study of UN Peacekeeping Public Information efforts, Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire. Lehmann made the following recommendation for future research:

        “The continuing problems of collaboration between the political and information   

          departments of the United Nations, especially in evolving standards for information

         components, media strategies and educational campaigns in peacekeeping missions,

         need to be monitored by scholars and academics of the United Nations.”[3]

     However, as Lehman also notes, while the United Nations Security Council gives mandates to all divisions and departments of the United Nations around the world to provide guidance for senior management, these mandates are often vague and open to broad interpretation.  As a result, the Public Information Divisions of UN Peacekeeping missions, operating in remote locations thousands of miles away from the UN headquarters in New York, are technically under local mission command and are therefore open to experiments and innovations.  As shall be seen, this was the case with The MONUSCO Video Unit.

V.2.Aims

     The goal of Case Study #2 is to examine samples of 5 years of MONUSCO Video Unit productions with Film Analysis to test the following hypothesis:

     To successfully promote the mission mandate in the host country and engage the audience of that host country, UN Peacekeeping Mission video product must produce regular programs with dynamic narrative content presented exclusively by talent from the host country, as well as with aesthetic appeal in terms of both sound and image.

V.3. Method

     This case study will examine representative productions produced and distributed by The MONUSCO Video Unit using Bordwell and Thompson’s guidelines for Analysis employed in Chapter III.  Otherwise, the primary source for the data used in this study is the author’s official UN MISSION END REPORT, a document all UN managers are required to submit when they retire from Field Service.

     In this context, it is important to remember that the UN lacks the capacity to do formal audience surveys to determine the success or failure of any video program. As a result, internal success or failure of a given program is determined primarily the quantitative method of determining how frequently a given program is shown. There is no possibility of any qualitative assessment, aside from informal surveys of the intended audience.

         As a result, as was often the case with United Nations Television productions, the lack of a negative response leads some senior managers to conclude that communications goals have been achieved, and that the mission therefore has been accomplished. This author’s goal has always been to aim a bit higher , and it is his hope that the positive response of the Congolese on all levels of society to programs like MONUSCO REALITES will make these programs templates for future UN Peacekeeping mission videos.

 

V.4. The MONUSCO Video Unit

     MONUSCO, or the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was created in 1999, and was called MONUC (The United Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo) until 2010, when it was renamed MONUSCO (The United Nations Stabilization Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo).   MONUSCO is currently the oldest UN Peacekeeping mission, and is also the largest, with 22,000 military and civilian UN Peacekeepers, and the most expensive, with an annual budget of $1,141,848,100 for 2017-2018.[4]

     Each year, the United Nations Security Council revises and renews the MONUSCO Mandate.  While the MONUSCO mandate has varied slightly from year to year, the mandate for the MONUSCO Video Unit from 2007-2012 was fairly consistent: to produce video material that would explain the MONUSCO Mandate to the Congolese population, and to organize distribution of that material for broadcast on all major Congolese television stations. The mandate never mentioned aesthetic issues such as formats or styles. As a result, all proposals relating to communications strategy, program format and content had to be approved by the MONUSCO Director of Public Information, who was the direct supervisor of the Chief, Video Unit. As shall be seen, the identity of the Director of Public Information is a major factor in Video Unit performance.

V.4.1 MONUSCO Video Unit 2007-2012: A Chronology

     Since Director/DPI had final approval of all MONUSCO Video Unit productions, a positive creative and professional relationship between Director/DPI and Chief, Video Unit was critical to success. Unfortunately, for the time frame between December, 2007 and July, 2012, when the author was Chief, Video Unit, there were seven different directors or acting directors of MONUSCO Department of Public Information. Seven different directors in the course of 56 months is a high management turn-over for any organization, and, as shall be seen, made continuity of mandate interpretation and communications strategy difficult. What follows is a brief summary of Video Unit performance from the author’s perspective as Chief, Video Unit from November 27, 2007, to July 12, 2012.

V. 5. 27 November, 2007- 1 August, 2008:  Mario Zamorano, Director

     The author began his assignment in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, as Chief, MONUC Video Unit, on 7 December, 2007. His first supervisor was Mario Zamorano, Director, Division of Public Information; William Lacy Swing was Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for MONUC, and therefore head of the MONUC mission, and Mario’s boss.

     The author’s Terms of Reference put him in charge of all UN video production in the country, as well as all non-UN video production. [5] While all foreign journalists had to buy a correspondent’s license directly from the Congolese authorities, MONUSCO Video Unit staff were exempt from this requirement. To assist foreign journalists in their coverage, MONUSCO Video Unit was mandated to provide both stock video material as well as logistical support and security to any media entity covering mission activities. Since parts of the DRC were hot war zones, the security was essential; however, the logistical support was even more valuable, since MONUSCO had created its own internal air service called MOVCON after Congolese carriers had been judged unsafe. In practice, of course, this support also helped the mission keep an eye on foreign journalists, as well as identify any potentially bad actors. [6]

V.5.1. The Video Unit Team

     On the author’s arrival, he found a Video Unit consisting of a P-3 Video Producer, 4 International F/S 4 Editors, 3 national staff cameramen, a sound engineer and a head writer. This was an impressive team; everyone had already spent a year or more in Congo, which was a demanding environment on many levels. The author’s initial concern was the apparent imbalance between editors and cameramen, but he quickly discovered that most of the editors, like Alan Brain and Titus Nyukuri, were good videographers as well as skilled professional editors, and were ready to serve as cameramen when needed.

        In addition, one editor, Meriton Ahmeti, was an excellent graphic designer and composer who could add production value to any production, while another editor, Kevin Jordan, was an internet expert. The head writer, Ado Abdou, was also the focal point with the Congolese television stations, and the sound engineer, Georges Dominique, was an expert at solving any acoustic problem that could arise. The national staff (Congolese) cameramen were invaluable both as fixers and for their ability to cover events competently but discretely.[7] The only international cameraman in the unit was Carlo Ontal, a talented P-3 Video Producer who had been acting as OIC; upon the author’s arrival, Director DPI Mario Zamorano deployed Carlo to Goma to set up a production office in Eastern Congo.

      As the capital of volatile North Kivu province, Goma was the hub of MONUC peacekeeping efforts, which required coverage. Goma was also on the border to the traditional Congolese enemy of Rwanda, about 2,500 kilometers away from Kinshasa – about a two-hour flight. Nonetheless, the author was able to contact his team in Goma by cellphone or internet any time of day to resolve any communications problems. By any standards, the MONUC Video Unit was an extraordinarily talented and deep professional team, and, aside from occasional illnesses, this team remained intact during the author’s tenure.

      Equipment was also impressive; the author found an office equipped with the latest Final Cut Pro software, Sony HD cameras, and a Systems contract which enabled us to order compatible replacements without going through the time-consuming ordeal of Procurement. As long as we planned ahead to allow time for delivery, this Systems contract enabled us to have working equipment at all times in a country with no repair services whatsoever.[8]

V.5.2. Production

     Under Mario Zamorano, the MONUC Video Unit’s primary task was a weekly video news program called La Semaine en Bref, with a length varying from 5-15 minutes, as well as a monthly video magazine called ONU Reportages.  The La Semaine en Bref workflow was straight forward.

      Head scriptwriter Ado Abdou would write the French script for the narrator and send it to the Chief, Video Unit for revision. The Chief, Video Unit would then send the revised script to Mario Zamorano for his approval. Once the final script was approved, the Video Unit team would record the off-camera narration with the narrator, veteran Congolese presenter and translator Yulu Kabamba, and then give it to one of the editors for the final edit.   Meanwhile, the editor waited for fresh material from the Goma Video Unit, which was hand carried on one of the daily MONUC flights by some friendly UN Peacekeeper. The MONUC Video Unit also recorded the weekly MONUC Press Conference with representatives of the Congolese press, and usually used a soundbite or two.

V.5.3. Analysis: La Semaine en Bref[9]

     Ostensibly a weekly video magazine to show the activities of MONUC to the Congolese population on all the major Congolese television stations, La Semaine en Bref is a free form compilation of stories from around the DRC running at around 17 minutes. The opening graphics creatively spell out the title of the program, and then morph into a title for the week’s episode: La RDC A La Recherche de la Paix. Since French is the official national language of the RDC, all titles are in French and all speakers speak in French, or are dubbed into French.

     This episode starts with a series of shots of fighting around the country, and we hear the narrator, Yulu Kabamba, begin to speak off-camera in classic omniscient Direct Narration style. Yulu has an excellent bass voice, and is clearly an experienced professional narrator as he speaks in general terms about the horrors of warm but we never see him, Instead, we see a Congolese soldier sitting on the ground with his machine gun next to a UN vehicle.

      We then cut to a moving shot from a UN vehicle on patrol, and we hear the narrator talking about how the UN Mission to the Congo started in 1999, and about how the UN has been feeding thousands of people ever since, while training the Congolese army and police, and has held the first democratic elections in the  DRC in 40 years.

     

         We then see the popular former MONUC Special Representative of the Secretary General, William Lacey Swing, tell us how the major elements have now been created to start the third Republic of the Congo, starting with the presidential elections of 2006. We then see Ross Mountain, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, reminding us that only 7 years before, the country had been the scene of the biggest war since World War II, involving seven different African nations, and is still in the process of recovery.

         We cut to a MONUC jet landing at N’dili Airport in Kinshasa, the capital, and we see a group of young Congolese disembarking. Off-camera, Yulu tells us that these young people have come from around the country to participate in special activities related to The International Day of Peace. These activities include meeting other Congolese youths from around the country, and ultimately meeting UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in a video conference.

       We see one of the youths talking about his home village near the eastern hub of Goma, and, then we cut to powerful scenes of the intense fighting in Kinshasa after the 2006 presidential elections. The sound is diagetic, and we hear shooting. Then we see soldiers taking a break, and Yulu tells us that this fighting was between the forces of President Joseph Kabila and warlord Jean-Pierre Bemba, and that approximately 100 Congolese died. Then we see a MONUC convoy on patrol in Kinshasa delivering a wounded MONUC staff member to the MONUC medical clinic.  Yulu tells us that MONUC arranged a ceasefire and for talks between the two opposing factions, and things could have been much worse.

          Mr. Swing then says on camera that there had been a risk that the entire investment of 7 years of peacekeeping in the DRC would crumble, but that wiser heads prevailed and decided to resume the larger peace process.

          We see the Congolese meeting with Mr. Swing. It is clear that the young Congolese respect and admire Mr. Swing, who had already been in the DRC for 4 years, and had the nickname “Coco Swing”, or Grandfather Swing. We then cut to shots of refugees arriving at refugee camps in the Eastern Congo, and Ross Mountain tells us that it is impossible to build a new society on corpses, and that thousands of people are still dying each month. Yulu tells us that the path to peace is still in progress in the East.

           One of the young Congolese students then talks about the importance of peace, and we see him in a MONUC video conference room with the other students as they watch a video monitor; at the bottom of the image, we see a title: 21 September, 2007, The International Day of Peace. On the video monitor, we see the American actor Michael Douglas in New York, hosting the official ceremony in the UN General Assembly and introducing UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, who speaks in English, welcoming all the delegates from around the world participating via video conference. UNSG Ban Ki-Moon makes a short speech, which is overdubbed into French, and he asks the Congolese youths if they have any questions.

         A Congolese girl, Farah, says in excellent English that she has a question for her Lebanese counterparts. She asks if they believe they now will have a stable peace, and what they are doing to keep that peace. Mr. Swing, who is sitting next to her, approves of her question, and her colleagues applaud her. Another Congolese youth describes the pain and suffering caused by the war in the DRC, and his Lebanese counterpart says they have experienced similar suffering, and asks if they can envisage a future without war. One Congolese youth answers and says he is looking forward to future exchanges with his fellow youths from around the world.

         Then a UN functionary in New York signs off and we see the jubilant youths in the Kinshasa conference room waving flags for the camera. We hear the voice of Yulu returning as he makes a final round up of the story. We see the happy youths filing out and shaking hands with Mr. Swing, who has the final words for the camera:” We now have a new republican Congolese army, created with international assistance, and we will soon have 11 brigades to deal with those who oppose the peace, so I can say now, without any doubt, we will soon have a durable peace in the DRC…”

Commentary:  First of all, the lack of any apparent narrative structure is a problem; there is no dramatic connection between any of the events shown, nor is there any sense of urgency. In addition, at 17 minutes, this episode is far too long; it is difficult to sustain viewer interest for that amount of time without a clear narrative structure MONUC had about 30 minutes of paid weekly airtime on Congolese television, so 10 minutes or less was the mathematically ideal length for a program for several screenings per week.

        Stylistically speaking, La Semaine en Bref is archaic in form, with a patronizing male Voice of God narration over images of VIP sound bites - traditionally safe corporate video fare designed to flatter bosses and avoid controversy. In addition, there is too little of the Congolese people the mission there to protect.  In short, La Semaine en Bref is a World War II relic - Griersonian newsreel in the 21^st Century – but without any combat footage and the dramatic context of World War II itself. However, when the author expressed his concerns to Mario, he dismissed them, saying that a didactic approach was necessary, because “the Congolese are stupid…” The author disagreed, but Mario was the boss, so the format remained unchanged until his departure in August of 2008.

V.5.4. Analysis: ONU Reportages (Police)  [10]

      ONU Reportages was a monthly video magazine of about 15 minutes in length with an on-camera Congolese presenter doing a story about a MONUC program in the DRC. In the selected sample, Tina Salama is the on-camera presenter telling the story directly to the viewers, and the story in this episode is about the training of the Congolese police force by MONUC trainers.

       This episode gets off to a dramatic start with a 30 second tease showing muscular Indian policemen performing karate kata and other karate drills. The only sound is the diegetic sound of the training itself – and Tina herself does not start speaking until 0:30. This kind of lively opening works to get viewer attention, particularly in the DRC.  When we first see Tina, she is standing in front of a MONUC armored personnel carrier as she announces in French that this will be an episode of ONU Reportages devoted to showing the training of the Congolese national police force, according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1355, by different elements of the MONUC forces.

        As she says this, we see two UN armored personnel carriers swinging into action, and then at 0:53, we see the opening titles of ONU Reportages with the UN logo, and hear the signature theme music, which sounds like old-fashioned canned theme music one has heard elsewhere.

     At 1:11, we cut back to Tina, who gives details of the police training program, which we then see as she speaks. The MONUC instructors are teaching the PNC crowd control techniques, and we hear one of the MONUC instructors describing what they are doing. We see him as he speaks, and then cut back to the PNC receiving their diplomas.

     We hear the voice of another MONUC instructor as he describes the purpose of the training. We see his face, and then cut back to the PNC learning to use computers. We then hear the voice of a third MONUC instructor and see his face as he talks about human rights training, and we see Congolese prisoners in a real jail.

      The MONUC instructors attempt to teach them what is acceptable and what is not acceptable in the treatment of prisoners. A MONUC coordinator then tells us that this training is essential as part of a program to reform the PNC, which he tells us is currently not professional enough to serve in a democratic state.

     At 5:56, we move out onto the street in the capital of Kinshasa to follow a MONUC police patrol in an armored personnel carrier as Colonel Ousmane Cisse, MONUC Police Chief in Kinshasa, tells us that the first task for the newly trained PNC will be to protect MONUC installations and personnel in the city.

     At 8:35, Tina Salama returns to tell us about the UN Security Council mandate requiring MONUC to introduce security sector reform across the DRC. We then see PNC learning how to direct traffic on the main boulevard of Kinshasa.At around 12:07, we hear Colonel Jacqueline Masengi, Focal Point for MONUC Police talking about training the PNC in how to deal with the problem of sexual violence. She refers to the UN Resolution 1325 affirming the rights of women to live free from sexual violence.

     Presenter Tina Salama returns at 12:40 to tell us the goal of this program is to leave the Congolese with a professional and efficient police force. We then see well-armed MONUC police on patrol in Goma, and North Kivu governor Julien Paluku tells us why it is important to have a professional and well-trained police force. We then see PNC practicing crowd control drills against other PNC acting as demonstrators. The PNC charge them with their shields and batons, and the demonstrators disperse.

     We see other drills, and then, at 15:00, Tina Salama summarizes the goals of the training - to leave the people of the DRC with a professional police force that is respectful of human rights- and signs off as we see the PNC riot police in their body armor parading towards us…

Commentary:  ONU Reportages is a straight forward, documentary style news reportage with an excellent on-camera presenter in Tina Salama, who was already a star in the DRC thanks to her work for Radio Okapi, which was the official MONUC radio station, and the most popular and trusted radio station in the country, reaching approximately half the population of c. 70 million Congolese. Her presence gives ONU Reportages immediate credibility with the local population, and is invaluable. The visual coverage of the police training is smooth and professional, and the MONUC trainers are allowed to speak for themselves. The training itself is visually dramatic, and is lively enough to attract audience attention. However, some editing could shorten the program to a more practical length of 10 minutes or less.

V.5.5. PSAs and Promotional Shorts

     As regular scheduled programs, La Semaine en Bref and ONU Reportages were a priority, and filled most of the MONUC Video Unit production schedule. However, there was also space in the schedule for Public Service Announcements, commonly known as PSAs, and. promotional shorts.

V.5.6. Analysis: Miriam Makeba Speaks Out Against Sexual Violence[11]

      Based on YouTube hits alone, one of the most popular MONUC Video Unit programs from this time was a 2:11 minute PSA the author produced on sexual violence featuring the iconic South African singer Miriam Makeba. Shot under primitive conditions with bad light and poor acoustics, the video shows Ms. Makeba addressing a crowd of Congolese women about the subject of sexual violence. She speaks in English, with a Congolese translator translating to French behind her. The Congolese women listen respectfully, and seem to be in awe of her.

Commentary:  Popularly known as Mama Africa, Ms. Makeba had been brought to Kinshasa by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, who had arranged for her to address a group of Congolese women in a field near the Kinshasa airport. We found out about it at the last minute, and rushed to cover the event. When we arrived, Ms. Makeba and her entourage were sitting under a canopy waiting to address the crowd. She was clearly in poor health, and this trip to the DRC was, in fact, her last public appearance before she died later that year. The resulting PSA is technically primitive, but Ms. Makeba’s regal presence and passion made the video compelling enough to become a big hit that we showed many times as a filler on Congolese television, and which still has more hits than any of our shows on YouTube.

V.5.7. Analysis: Heart of Africa[12]

      Heart of Africa is a 4:37 compilation video produced in English at the request of the MONUC Force Commander General Babucar Gaye so he could show his fellow UN Peacekeeping commanders meeting at the UN Secretariat in New York how the MONUC Mission had evolved from 1999-2008. The video tells the story chronologically with images and text cut to fast-moving original music composed by editor Meriton Ahmeti, who also did all the graphics. The result is a time capsule of the first 9 years of the MONUC mission.

Commentary: Our goal was to make something short and hard-hitting that would get the attention of the intended audience of military commanders from around the world, as well as provide a thumbnail sketch of the MONUC mission – specifically, the reasons the Security Council created the mission, the challenges that confronted the mission, and how the mission dealt with those challenges. This provided a basic dramatic structure which helped make the video both engaging and compelling. We managed to completely avoid any narration – all basic information is conveyed in short moving texts superimposed on the images. In our view, this forced the audience to concentrate on what they were seeing, while the music and sound effects created a dynamic atmosphere full of forward movement thanks to Meriton Ahmeti’s masterful use of the After Effects and Motion Graphics applications.  Statistics showing the yearly growth of the mission were in boxes on the lower right side of the frame, set against the background of the most dramatic visuals of MONUC military action we could find from our archives from the previous 9 years.

            Since the primary MONUC mandate was civilian protection, we also wanted to show Congolese civilians benefitting from the MONUC presence. Then we showed some of the other major priorities – like training the Congolese armed forces. With maps, we showed how the MONUC forces were deployed in the DRC, emphasizing the size of the country. Finally, we tried to show what was at stake: 1. The immense natural resources of the DRC. 2. Human lives, with c. 5 million deaths in the major conflict involving seven different African nations prior to our arrival.3. The strategic location of the DRC, which borders 9 different African nations, and is the geographic Heart of Africa. Finally, the video concludes with some of the mission’s achievements: the first free and fair presidential elections in 2006, and the first peace in 20 years. General Gaye himself delivers a final on-camera epilogue, telling the audience in subtitled French that, while  the Congolese appreciate what the UN has done for their country, there is much work to be done, and that even though the MONUC mission is the largest and most expensive UN Peacekeeping mission, the effort needs to be seen in the context of the immense size of the DRC, and that the country’s  path to peace will be a long one, but that he is optimistic. In my opinion, General Gaye was wise to avoid any declarations of victory, since he was well aware that the DRC was, and still is, always full of surprises. The video was apparently a big hit in New York with the other force commanders, who elected General Gaye to be their chief. General Gaye appreciated our efforts, and his patronage was invaluable when we wanted to cover future military activities.

V.5.6. Distribution

   At that time, Congolese television broadcast was Analog, so Video Unit had to transfer the final program from Digital DVD to VHS tape for distribution. As a result, sound and picture quality were poor when finally broadcast on analog Congolese televisions. These tapes were then sent out on MONUC flights to the sectors around the country for distribution to local TV stations. Since we paid every station for about 30 minutes of weekly airtime, we tried to keep records of every broadcast, though we had to rely on our colleagues in the sectors to keep track of the broadcasts. As mentioned, there were no feedback mechanisms, aside from the office of DRC Government Minister of Information Lambert Mende to let us know if we had committed a political faux-pas.[13]

     Shortly after the author arrived on December 7, 2007, hoping to get better acquainted with our intended market, he invited the representatives of all the Congolese TV stations we were dealing with for a chat and coffee. The meeting proved both illuminating and educational; generally, he found relations with our Congolese colleagues positive, though he suspected they were too smart to tell us how boring our programs were. After all, we were paying customers.

V.5.7. A Changing of the Guard

     Perhaps the major event during this period was the abrupt departure of our boss SRSG William Lacey Swing in early 2008, just before the signing of the historic Goma Peace Accords. The timing was peculiar, since Mr. Swing had been SRSG for 5 years, and the Goma Peace Accords were arguably the climax of his life’s work as a diplomat in central Africa.

     It was also no secret that the Congolese, including President Kabila, himself, adored Mr. Swing, as did most UN staff. There had never been even the hint of any scandal, and it was common knowledge knew Mr. Swing scrupulously did everything by the book. In addition, Mr. Swing had been US Ambassador to the DRC and other African countries, and even spoke some of the indigenous Congolese languages.  It is safe to say that the UN Security Council’s abrupt decision to replace him was both a shock and a mystery to MONUC staff and the Congolese. 

       The Congolese were even more startled when Mr. Swing left before his successor, Alan Doss from the United Kingdom arrived, and there was no handover ceremony. After three decades of the Mobutu dictatorship, the Congolese were well versed in political theatre, and they understood the significance of diplomatic ritual- or the lack of it. For the author and others working in the MONUC Department of Public Information, it quickly became clear that SRSG Doss had no use for Mario. Among other things, Mr. Doss refused to meet with Mario, which made it impossible to create a communications strategy for the new mandate year of 2008-9. As a wily old UN veteran, Mario could see the writing on the wall, so he began to slowly prepare for his retirement until Human Resources could  hire the replacement Mr. Doss wanted. 

       Ironically, this turned out to be a blessing for the MONUC Video Unit. As a lame duck Director DPI for 6 months, Mario was a different man. Without any warning, he suddenly threw caution to the winds, and gave us great latitude to do virtually whatever we wanted. We were able take advantage of this unexpected freedom to do some of our best work, one of which was MONUC Human Rights, a long form, 34- minute, documentary in English on the work of the MONUC Human Rights Division, led by Mario’s good friend, the late Fernando Castanon.

V.7.1.  Analysis:  Human Rights[14]

     MONUC Human Rights is a long form (34 minutes) documentary on the work of the MONUC Human Rights Division under the leadership of Fernando Castanon, who was Director, Human Rights Division. Shot in basic cinema verité style in English, the video follows the daily activities of Human Rights Officers in a series of vignettes as they investigate reported cases of human rights violations around the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

     The film opens with dramatic testimony from survivors of the mass rapes of Songo Mboyo, an example of extreme sexual violence in a country already notorious for it. We do not see their faces, but we hear their voices as they describe their ordeal. While we hear them, we see images of tall grasses swaying in the wind. This tease effectively tells the audience what the film is about, and what to expect.

      We then see Fernando Castanon explaining why human rights are important, and the importance of the Songo Mboyo case in particular. Fernando himself is the narrator, and he introduces each vignette, sometimes adding his own comments. There is no omniscient narrator; the only speakers are Fernando’s colleagues and the Congolese who are in each story. All sound is diagetic, and music is used only to punctuate bridges in the narrative and to heighten pathos. There are also some texts with quotes from Dag Hammarskjöld and Kofi Annan on the existential importance of human rights work. We then follow a human rights officer named Nicholas Vysney as he drives in a convoy near the Rwandan order to interview Congolese refugees in a camp near the iconic live volcano of Mount Nyiragongo. He needs an armed MONUC escort, since several armed groups have been active in the area, and he tells us that he is investigating several reported rapes and murders in the area.

         We then cut to other human rights workers visiting a Congolese prison in Bunia, to investigate the conditions of the prisoners and witness their exchange with the Congolese police chief running the prison. He seems to be in a state of disbelief; apparently, no one has ever asked him about the conditions in the prison before.

       We see Fernando at a meeting with his staff going over current cases, and then we see Fernando discussing these cases at a meeting with MONUC and Congolese colleagues. Fernando then tells us why human rights are an essential part of a UN Peacekeeping mission, and why impunity is unacceptable. We then see black and white images of the Songo Mboyo survivors, their faces hidden, and Fernando introduces the Songo Mboyo case as one which he and his colleagues had initially thought of as a success, but one which he subsequently realized was not successful at all.

      We then flashback to see a MONUC human rights team flying into the remote jungle village of Songo Mboyo in 2004, three months after the mass rapes, and team leader Marcella Favretto tells us what they found. Marcella tells us that she and her colleagues decided that it was time to signal an end to impunity by finding a way to get the Congolese authorities to punish the perpetrators, who were Congolese soldiers. Fernando comments that it is difficult to be a human rights officer, because it can be frustrating when you do not find justice for the victims

      We then cut to a statement by human rights officer Louis Marie Bouaka about what it takes to be a human rights officer, and we see some of the atrocities that human rights officers are forced to confront, including cadavers. We then see some of the appalling prison conditions discovered by the human rights officers seen earlier inspecting the prisons, and again we see the two human rights officers asking the head of the prison about the conditions they have found. He smiles in incomprehension.

        Marcella then takes us back to Songo Mboyo. As they were interviewing witnesses, dozens of women began to emerge in various states of fear, terror and trauma from the forest where they had been hiding for months. Some are still shaking. Then we begin to hear their eyewitness accounts of what happened in Lingala with subtitles, and Marcella describes how she took the case back to Kinshasa to get support for a prosecution by the government authorities.

   

            We then cut to a scene in a Bukavu courtroom, where four journalists from the MONUC radio station Radio Okapi have been charged with murdering a third Okapi journalist. Luc Henkinbrandt, another human rights officer, tells us he has been following the case, and has observed many irregularities in the prosecution case. He describes the irregularities in convincing detail as we see two of those charges acquitted in court after a year behind bars.

While he is happy to see two of the journalists freed, he is clearly dismayed by the verdict

sentencing the other two to death.

           After following Nicholas Vysney on patrol investigating other cases in North Kivu, we see Marcella Favretto returning to Songo Mboyo, where the Congolese military authorities are trying the soldiers accused of the rapes. Marcella is clearly elated that the case is actually being prosecuted, but Fernando then gives us the results: of approximately 70 alleged perpetrators, only 10 were charged. Of those 10, 7 were convicted, 1 was acquitted – and they all escaped. On that somber note, the film concludes with final thoughts from some of the human rights officers shown in the film as they attempt to philosophically justify their work, and why they think it is essential to continue the struggle for human rights and justice in spite of the challenges.

 Commentary:  Thanks to a heroic effort by Director/Editor Alan Brain, MONUC Human Rights was one of our best productions, and we were lucky to be able to make it. First of all, MONUC Human Rights Director Fernando Castanon gave us exclusive rights to never-before seen footage of a notorious human rights case in Province Equateur – the Songo Mboyo mass rapes –which made our video a powerful statement about sexual violence in the DRC.

        Equally important, Fernando himself was honest and eloquent on camera about the importance of human rights in UN Peacekeeping, as well as the many UN failures in dealing with them.  We knew Fernando was leaving; what we did not know was that he had terminal cancer; perhaps that was why Mario gave us an unusual amount of time to allow director/editor Alan Brain to shoot in classic cinema verite style, following human rights workers around the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The final version was sent to New York and broadcast around the world by UN DPI in New York for International Human Rights Day in December, 2009. The video was also shown at the memorial service for Fernando Castanon at UNHQ in New York in 2010.

         Today, the video is being used in Human Rights training by UNHCHR in Geneva, and in UN Peacekeeper training at the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden. It has never been shown in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

V.7.2. Analysis: Le Professeur Repond![15]

   Another special assignment from this period was Le Professeur Repond! Mario asked us to find a way to respond to a Congolese disinformation campaign against the mission claiming that the Congolese government was paying the costs of MONUC. While we initially found this allegation preposterous, we discovered many Congolese actually believed it, so we realized we had to create a suitable response. Our solution was to create a Comic Q&A show  of 6 ½ minutes called Le Professeur Repond! featuring an African Einstein named Professeur Kivuila created by a brilliant Congolese mime Mira Mihkenza, who was already well known for his popular music video Coco Souing.[16] This production combined dramatic elements with graphics, and it took time to find a format.

      Le Professeur Repond! begins with an eye-catching graphic sequence introducing a fictitious Congolese television station called TV Ndjoku, (TV Elephant in the Congolese language of Lingala). After 10 seconds, we cross-fade to the TV Ndjoku studio, where we see two Congolese presenters, Christophe and Jenna, applying their last -minute make-up, seemingly unaware that the cameras are already rolling. Jenna is doing her nails when she  suddenly notices the camera is on, and snaps into character, as does Christophe.Jenna warmly welcomes the television audience to TV Ndjoku’s second seminar at the Ecole Lumumba, featuring the famous Congolese grand savant Professor Kivuila. Christophe then grandiosely announces that the question to be answered in this seminar will

be: “Who pays for MONUC?”

     We then see a zany graphic bridge featuring the image of the learned Professor Kivuila, along with the title of the program, Le Professeur Repond! followed by the title of the episode:

 Lecon 2: Qui Paye la MONUC?

     After another zany graphic bridge, we see Professor Kivuila in front of a blackboard, giving a lecture to his students at Ecole Lumumba. He is tall and thin, and his goatee and glasses evoke those of the iconic Congolese independence hero Patrice Lumumba. However, his wild and unkempt hair have more in common with the Soviet leader Leon Trotsky, and his clothes are monochromatic – white shirt, black vest and trousers – but with red socks for comic relief.

Gesturing with his unlit pipe, he announces that the topic of the day is a subject that has been hotly discussed on the streets of Kinshasa: “Who pays for MONUC?”

    We see a class full of attentive young students sitting behind their desks in their traditional French school uniforms- the girls in white blouses and blue skirts, and the boys in white shirts and blue shorts or trousers. They seem engaged, and take notes as he speaks. He tells them that in order to get a feeling for the views of ordinary Congolese people on the subject, he has arranged for interviews on the streets of Kinshasa.

     We cut to a series of quick vox populi style interviews with Congolese on the streets of Kinshasa in which they tell us who they think is paying for MONUC. The images of the interviews are framed by an analog television monitor, to suggest that he is showing these interviews to his students in the class.

     All five Congolese shown say that they think the MONUC mission is being paid for by the Congolese government. As each one speaks, we see a super-imposed image of Professeur Kivuila giving them a thumbs down of disapproval. We then cut to a screen of white noise, and then go back to the Ecole Lumumba classroom as the Professor says, “ As you can see, there are many of our fellow citizens who think that MONUC is paid for by the Democratic Republic of the Congo…”

       This is followed by a dizzying pinwheel transition worthy of Alice in Wonderland which takes us to Professor Kivuila’s Secret Laboratory, full of colorful lights and luminous objects. The professor welcomes us, wearing his white laboratory coat; he tells us that in his secret laboratory, he tries to find out the truth – the real story – behind things that we are seeing. And in this case, he has discovered that some of his Congolese brothers and sisters think that the Congolese government is paying for MONUC. We move in for a close-up as the Professor emphatically tells us, “Let me assure you – this is not the case!”

         He then explains that it is the members of the United Nations who pay for MONUC – and that in these times of economic instability, MONUC is an expensive proposition. But, he says, “let’s see what our little friends have to say…”

        Another dizzying pinwheel transition takes us back to the austere classroom at Ecole Lumumba, where the students are writing questions for their professor as he says, “An expensive peace is a better deal than a cheap war… Do you understand? Peace is a valuable commodity…”

        One of his students startles him by asking why MONUC has not been able to restore peace throughout Congo – particularly in the East, where many Congolese are still suffering.

         “That is a very good question,” says the professor. “It is important to understand that it is difficult to simply create peace. Rather, peace is a long-term process…”

        He then goes on to list MONUC’s major programs: the disarming of armed groups, the de-mobilization of those groups, and the re-insertion of ex-combatants in the regular Congolese armed forces. He explains that MONUC’s role is almost like that of a referee in a football match, and that sometimes when things go wrong, people blame the referee…

        We see another dizzying pinwheel transition and return to the professor in his secret laboratory. He says the seminar is almost over, and that he hopes the viewers have enjoyed it.

He then says he would like to leave us with a final thought:

       “The DRC is an important country both for Africa and the world… If there is no stability in the DRC, there is no stability in Africa. That is why the United Nations and the international community are here. As soon as there is a stable peace in Congo, the international community will leave…The UN will not stay here in Congo forever…”

        He spins the glowing globe in front of him and glares at the audience. “The world is very small, and the international community has many other problems to resolve!”

        He bids farewell to the audience, and we cut back to our two presenters Jenna and Christophe in the TV Ndjoku studio. They thank Professor Kivuila and Ecole Lumumba for their kind cooperation, and sign off. The final theatrical credits come on, with the names of the star – Mira Mihkenza – and all the students who participated, with special thanks to Ecole Lumumba. Only at the very end does the audience see that this was a production of the MONUC Video Unit.

Commentary: The goal was to create an amusing program to deal with difficult subjects like this one that we could regularly put on YouTube. I knew from past experience that the UN has a problem with humor, but the possibility of collaboration with a popular Congolese artist like Mira Mihkenza provided an opportunity that was hard to resist. I had admired his music video Coco Souing, and when I talked with him and discovered he loved Charlie Chaplin and was a classically trained mime, I knew we could work together. As previously mentioned, this program was our response to a Congolese disinformation campaign saying that the Congolese government was paying for MONUC, which had a budget of about $1 billion per year. In our informal research on the streets of Kinshasa, we discovered that many people believed this rumor to be true, so we  realized that our main challenge in this program would be conveying the basic message this idea was ridiculous without offending anyone ,and while also making it clear that  the international community was paying for MONUC  without being patronizing.

       Stylistically, Le Professeur Repond! is a mock Congolese replica of one of the educational programs popular in the Francophone world, with the zany Professeur Kivuila as our main character and educator. We were able to use the historic Congolese Ecole Lumumba as a basic location, and the sons and daughters of Congolese staff members volunteered to be students.

       We were clearly taking a few risks but we hoped Mira’s popularity and the good nature of the program would win hearts and minds. When we showed Le Professeur Repond! on all our Congolese broadcast television channels, there was no negative response; indeed, initial anecdotal reports were positive. However, our new MONUC boss Alan Doss did not like the program, and, we soon learned he preferred a technocratic /corporate style.

         In this context, it is worth mentioning that one of my first goals prior to my arrival had been to create a MONUC YouTube channel to help offset some of the negative portrayals of MONUC on that platform by groups like the handicapped musicians Staf Brenda Bili. This was the thought behind TV Ndjoku – intended to be a social media  cousin of our popular radio station Radio Okapi.I had also hoped that a YouTube channel might enable our MONUC colleagues dispersed around the country to watch our programs, since most had no access to Congolese television.   However, when I arrived in the DRC and approached our colleagues in CITS, (Communications and Information Technology Service) they told me that they had blocked YouTube on all UN computers because they had allegedly caught some staff members watching “pornography” on YouTube. Since I knew YouTube did not show pornography, I found this an unlikely scenario, but I quickly realized we could not expect any support from CITS. I talked with our resident IT expert Kevin Jordan of the MONUC Video Unit, and we decided to create our own YouTube station on our own private server. Mario gave us his approval before he left, and the result was www.YouTube.m/MONUCVIDEO (now www.YouTube.com/MONUSCO) which has all of our programs from 2008-2012[17]

V.8. 1 August, 2008- 1 September, 2008:  Jean Jacques Simon, OIC

     When Mario finally left, we heard that Kevin S. Kennedy from UNHQ in New York would soon be Director and that Jean Jacques Simon, Chief of Radio Okapi, the MONUC radio station, would be temporary Officer in Charge (OIC).  Traditionally in the UN, an OIC minds the storpe until the boss arrives, and Jean Jacques met with me to let me know that Mr. Doss wanted to replace La Semaine en Bref as soon as possible, which was no surprise.

    We discussed alternatives, including Mr. Doss’ idea for brief video comments by Mr. Doss that could be embedded inside the Congolese news broadcasts. I advised Jean Jacques that the Congolese stations would never accept inserting UN sound bites into their own news programs, and I was soon proved correct. While I was happy to see the end of La Semaine en Bref, I never suspected that Jean Jacques and a new P-3 Radio Producer from the UK close to Mr. Doss were surreptitiously planning a massive reorganization of DPI.

       What we had thought would be a relatively quiet period of preparation for the transition suddenly became an institutional civil war for survival.  When the P-3 Radio Producer foolishly submitted his personally written plan for this reorganization of the division to Mr. Doss on official UN e-mail, the MONUC Chief of Staff dutifully followed UN rules and sent this written plan to all those affected by the plan, including all Unit Chiefs like myself. The war was on.

     There were 6 different Unit Chiefs in DPI -Radio, Video, Publications, Technical Support, Outreach, and the Spokesperson’s Office. We were all P-4’s, and , as the most senior chief  in a subsequent ad hoc DPI meeting, I argued that the P-3 Radio Producer  was neither qualified nor authorized to write an evaluation of anyone, and I demanded he write  a written apology with a full retraction and send this apology  to everyone in DPI , including Mr. Doss.

     Mistakenly thinking he still had the support of Mr. Doss, the P-3 refused, apparently unaware that MONUC DPI was actually under the direct supervision of DSRSG Ross Mountain, and not Mr. Doss. In the UN system, the chain of command is sacrosanct, and DSRSG Mountain, a tough veteran from New Zealand of many UN Peacekeeping missions, was furious that he had been kept out of the loop by a junior information officer like the P-3. DSRSG Mountain demanded an immediate clarification from Mr. Doss, who, as a UN veteran himself knew the rules, proceeded to blame the P-3 and his friend, Radio Okapi Chief Jean Jacques Simon, for acting on their own without his knowledge.

      As a result, both the P-3 and Jean Jacques Simon soon found themselves the subject of UN investigations for misconduct. Already in trouble for other unrelated misconduct, within a year, Jean Jacques was in Haiti working for UNICEF, and the P-3 was last seen working for an NGO in Papua, New Guinea. Ironically, for the Video Unit, the internal drama proved to be a positive bonding experience; we had all stuck together under duress, and now we had to perform for our new boss, Kevin S. Kennedy. Personally, I welcomed the change, since I knew we could produce something far more interesting than La Semaine en Bref.

V.8.1. Production

      Due to the unresolved management issues, there was no production during this period.

V.9. October, 2008- 2 February, 2010:  Kevin S. Kennedy, Director

       The author knew Kevin Kennedy from New York, and was happy about the prospects of working with him. He did not disappoint. Kevin proved to be a demanding and hardworking supervisor with an extensive knowledge of the UN system, as well as a sophisticated communications professional always ready to engage his colleagues on all levels to get their views. For us in video, this was particularly important, since he was receptive to our ideas and our needs for his editorial input. Among other things, we were well aware that Kevin’s boss, Mr. Doss, was in love with speed, and wanted our media to be as real-time as possible. Unfortunately, he seemed oblivious to the fact that we were in a country where everything ran late, and where the technical infrastructure was a few decades behind the Western world.

      For example, shortly after Kevin arrived, Mr. Doss demanded that a live telecast of his first Town Hall meeting in Kinshasa be broadcast to all the sectors around the country. I tried to make it clear that a live video transmission would be impossible, but our colleagues in CITS foolishly tried to ingratiate themselves by offering a live audio transmission without video. The live audio transmission was a disaster. The feedback from the speakers was so loud that every word was unintelligible both in the Kinshasa Town Hall as well as across the DRC.

          Mr. Doss’ obsession with speed was also evident in his initial demand that Video Unit produce a daily video response to some item in the DRC news that had irked him.  Mr. Doss wanted that response embedded in the local Congolese news programs, but, as we had warned Kevin, this idea proved to be a non-starter when the Congolese TV stations refused to allow it.

V.9.1. Production

       Eventually, we convinced Kevin Kennedy to let us produce a weekly video news magazine showing how MONUC was helping the Congolese people recover from Africa’s World War. After a few demos, we found a format that met with everyone’s approval. The title of the new program was MONUC REALITES; we produced 78 episodesin the next year and a half, and the program became our signature production.

        The MONUC REALITES workflow proved to be more challenging than La Semaine en  Bref. First of all, we had to find a way to generate weekly feature stories on a regular basis so we would never run short. The newly created Video Unit Region East, led by producer Carlo Ontal, and editor Titus Nyukuri, was given the task of shooting feature stories around the East, while Kinshasa-based director/editor Alan Brain would shoot stories around the West.

        Every month, Carlo would come up with story ideas which we would fine tune in conference calls with Kevin Kennedy, and then Carlo would go on the road with Titus and our star freelance Congolese reporter Horeb Bulambo Shindano and shoot 3 or 4 stories per trip. Titus would do a rough cut in the field, and would send a hard disk with the stories to Kinshasa . Meanwhile, our national staff cameraman Serge Kasanga, Inga Paterne and Daniel Wangisha would cover news stories in the field and in Goma and Kinshasa as needed. 

        Back in Kinshasa, every Monday, head writer Ado Abdou would finish a script and send it to me. I would do a rewrite, and send to Kevin for approval, and then send it to the Presenter on Tuesday night. We had agreed that on-camera Congolese presente were essential to the success of MONUC REALITES and our primary presenter was Tina Salama, already a star in Congo with our popular MONUC radio station Radio Okapi, and Tina was later joined by Okapi colleagues Babel Mpongo and Suzanne Nzobi. All three wanted television experience, and we got permission to borrow them from Radio Okapi for an hour a week. [18]

        We would shoot the presentation on Wednesday, and editors Meriton Ahmeti and Kevin Jordan would finish the program on Thursday afternoon so I could then submit it for final approval by Kevin, so we could distribute to the TV stations by the weekend.

      With this workflow, we were able to produce over 120 programs between 2008- 2010, never missing a week, and we were able to maintain a consistency of quality. In this context, special credit must go to our brilliant graphic designer and composer Meriton Ahmeti, who gave the show a production value that was unlike anything the Congolese had ever seen, and therefore aroused great visual interest.  I worked hard with Meriton to keep the show moving by adding dynamic visual elements like texts and maps that would catch the eye.

       Finally, the Goma Video Unit team of producer/videographer Carlo Ontal, editor Titus Nyukuri, videographers Serge Kasanga and Inga Pasterne, along with our freelance  reporter Horeb Bulambo, did an exceptional job of telling the MONUC story under difficult and sometimes dangerous conditions in the remote eastern Congolese bush.

V.9.2. Analysis: MONUC REALITES 45 (Mambasa Bridge 1)[19]

           Seven minutes and 45 seconds long, MONUC REALITES 45 is the 45^th episode of our weekly video magazine MONUC REALITES. The episode starts with the signature logo of the program – a flash frame of the UN seal – and then cuts to a grainy black and white image of an Academy Leader counting down from 10 against a black background. The Academy Leader numbers are seen in the grainy pupil of an eye, and the camera moves in on the pupil as the numbers count down. We hear a fast-moving percussion track, and each time the number changes, we hear a beep, and a flash image of the MONUC Video Unit team in action shooting a story somewhere in the DRC.

         At 10 seconds, we see the producer’s acronym – DIP MONUC-followed by the title MONUC REALITES. At 0:12 seconds, we see presenter Tina Salama in the studio in color as she introduces the program and tells us what stories this week’s episode is featuring. We see only her head and shoulders against a black background framed by a graphic text on the left of the screen reading MONUC, and the name MONUC REALITES at the top. Below her, we see texts announcing important dates and events on the UN calendar.

        We see Tina head-on at first, but after 3 seconds we jump cut to a side angle of her speaking, giving the impression of a multi-camera shoot. As we jump cut, Tina tells us that this week’s feature story will be the reconstruction of an important bridge in Ituri Province, and then we jump cut to see her in extreme close up as she informs us that we will hear more about this story after the news.  Tina then tells us that a UN Special Reporter, Phillip Allston, has been visiting the DRC to investigate extra-judicial killings, and that he made a report to the press.

       At 0:55, we see Phillip Alston in a MONUC Conference Room describing his findings to Congolese journalists. Speaking in French, Mr. Allston says what he has discovered so far has been very disturbing, and he states that both the FARDC and MONUC need to change their policies so that the mistakes are not repeated in the future. At 1:36, we cut back to Tina in ECU in the studio, and she tells us that several NGOs and other groups have published a report on human rights violations being committed by the armed forces in Operation Kimia 2, and 1:47, we cut back to the MONUC Conference Room, where Director of Public Information Kevin Kennedy describes the measures being taken by MONUC to protect civilians by helping, and urges FARDC commanders to follow the new MONUC policy of “ Zero tolerance “ for human rights violations in the future. Mr. Kennedy concludes by saying that MONUC may punish FARDC units who do not follow these directives by withholding logistical support. We cut to the logo of MONUC REALITES to the sound of the same beep heard earlier.

      At 2:55, we see Tina head-on in regular close-up as she introduces the feature story about the Mambasa Bridge being built in Ituri Province by a brigade of Indian engineers from MONUC. She explains how this strategically important bridge will link the city of Kisangani with the provinces of North and South Kivu, and how it is being financed as a joint venture between the British and Congolese governments. She then invites us to see how the project is progressing with MONUC REALITES reporter Horeb Bulambo on location in Ituri.

       At 3:20, we are on a boat in the Ituri River with reporter Horeb, who tells us why this bridge is so important as we see him crossing the river himself in his motor driven dinghy. He shows us the ruins of an old bridge, and explains that now the only way to cross the river is by barge. This opening shot is uncut, and, as the camera pulls back, we see the size and scale of the project in the background behind Horeb.

       We then see a local resident telling Rachel Brass, representing the British Embassy to the DRC, that the current ferry fees are prohibitively expensive, and that is why the bridge will be a big improvement. We see work being done on the bridge, and then we see Horeb asking Rachel how the British decided to finance the reconstruction of the bridge. As they walk around the construction site. Rachel explains to Horeb that the bridge fell apart in 2007, and the lack of a bridge was disrupting the traffic between the city of Kisangani and the eastern cities of Bunia, Goma and the neighboring country of Uganda.

        Rachel then tells Horeb that The British Ministry of Defence offered the services of a team of their engineers, which built a new bridge in the United Kingdom in segments, and then sent it by boat and truck via Kenya to be assembled in the DRC by Nepali engineers from MONUC. As she speaks, we see the Nepali engineers putting the bridge together and making rapid progress. As the tropical sun sets over the Mambasa River, Horeb signs off, and wishes all the viewers a good evening at 7:11. We see the MONUC REALITES logo, and hear the signature beep, before cutting back to Tina in the Kinshasa studio. Tina tells us that the Mambasa Bridge project is an example of the international community working with the Congolese authorities to improve the quality of life for the people of Congo. She signs off, and at 7:40, we see closing credits with the same signature music and graphics as we saw at the beginning of the program.   

  

 Commentary: The biggest initial challenge in creating MONUC REALITES was finding an interesting format with a length that we could realistically produce every week. When we finally agreed with Kevin on a weekly program of under 10 minutes in length, we developed a viable format. After several demos, we managed to create a video magazine that combined both a news segment and a feature story – with the news story the lead, but a vignette intro at the top as a tease for the feature story.  The strategy behind this structure was simple.

          We expected the audience to be intrigued by the feature story, but we also wanted them to watch the news items, so they had to see the news before they could see the feature story. I first learned this trick years ago when I was in India studying the Indian film industry. The Films Division of the Indian government was the world’s largest producer of informational films at the time, and they forced all commercial movie theatres to show (and pay for!) their films as shorts prior to the main feature. The Indian Institute of Mass Communications did studies on the Films Division products, and, much to their dismay, they found that it was difficult indeed to get people to watch their films unless they were sandwiched between the popular commercial films made according to what was called the Bombay Masala formula. [20]

            I remembered that study, and decided to make our new program a video sandwich with an attractive morsel the audience would want to see embedded in the propaganda we had to show. In homage to a French magazine I had liked as a youth, I decided to call our new program MONUC REALITES.

         There was much discussion regarding the name of the initial news segment; some Francophone West Africans thought it should be called ACTUALITES, but I felt that sounded too didactic and ponderous. I preferred the Anglophone NEWS, which, while offending some West African Francophone purists, apparently worked fine in the DRC.  The NEWS segment was followed by the attractive feature documentary story to be called REALITES, which was to be a short documentary about something interesting going on in the DRC – and that something might or might not be a UN activity.

         Some Francophone West African colleagues in UN Public Information were advocates of what they called “la didactique”- the didactic approach to public information,  showing only things the UN was doing for the Congolese, with the message being pounded home by a Voice of God narration. We felt that showing Congolese people working to rebuild their country on their own while telling their own stories was subtler and more effective.

     This difference in communications philosophies became a constant bone of contention over the next few years. Whenever we heard the question “Where’s the UN?”, our answer was “You are not the intended audience – the Congolese are!”

      As an on-camera reporter, Horeb had an engaging presence and did an excellent job of telling the story while keeping the visual flow moving at all times. He had good rapport with subjects from all social strata, and could also do on-camera simultaneously translation in any one of three indigenous Congolese languages, as well as English or French,

    Carlo and Horeb were productive as well as creative; MONUC REALITES 45 was one of 4 episodes on the construction of the Mambasa Bridge, and the story was one of our most popular with our bosses, as well as the Congolese. Critics of MONUC liked to say “MONUC does nothing!”, and the Mambasa Bridge story was the perfect answer to those critics. Aside from providing a riposte to MONUC’s enemies, this story was a big hit with British donors, which doubtless pleased SRSG Doss. As this episode shows, the iconic power of building bridges works on many levels.

V.9.3. Analysis: MONUC REALITES 72 (Kibua 1)[21]

             Aside from helping to rebuild the DRC, the primary MONUC mandate was Civilian Protection, which meant protecting Congolese civilians from the many armed groups that roamed the bush. This was a delicate subject, because the size of the country and the terrain made it impossible to protect all the people all the time, and there were periodic atrocities which served to remind all of MONUC staff that Civilian Protection was our first priority.

          MONUC REALITES 72 was the first in a series of programs attempting to show how MONUC was working to protect civilians in a remote area of North Kivu Province called Kibua by escorting the residents of Kibua to market in a nearby town called Ishunga.

         The 72nd episode of MONUC REALITES, MONUC REALITES 72 is a 9:24 minute video magazine with the same format as MONUC REALITES 45. The opening graphics and titles are exactly the same, the only difference being that the presenter is not Tina Salama, but Babel Mpongo, who, like Tina, was an established newscaster with the popular MONUC radio station called Radio Okapi.  After Babel’s opening introduction and the obligatory clip from the weekly MONUC press conference, at 1:39, we see Babel introducing the feature story, with the title of the story superimposed at the top of the screen: Marche sous bonne escorte. She explains that the villagers of Ishunga in North Kivu were unable to go to their traditional market in the neighboring village of Kibua for months because they were afraid of being attacked by elements of the Rwandan Hutu armed group called the FDLR en route. Now, thanks to the combined protection of the Congolese army and MONUC, the villagers of Ishunga can make the trip to market in Kibua once again. At 2:12, Babel introduces Horeb on location in Ishunga.

      In a spectacular establishing shot, we see Horeb walking towards us through the villagers as they prepare to make their journey to carry their goods from Ishunga to Kibua. As he walks, he explains in French that, every Friday, the villagers from Ishunga and other localities traditionally would walk to the market of Kibua, but have been unable to do so because it has been too dangerous. Now, thanks to the escort provided by MONUC Peacekeepers, the villagers from Ishunga can make their long trek to market again.

        At 3:00, we hear a song about hardships in the local language of Kisswahili, and see a montage of the people preparing for their journey with a final meal. Behind them, we see a contingent of heavily armed MONUC Peacekeepers from India watching the surrounding hills and the heavy bush for potential trouble.

       At 3:39, we see a local Ishunga resident talking with Horeb in Kisswahili, and at 3:48. Horeb provides a direct translation into French, saying that the resident tells him that before the MONUC escort, villagers had been attacked on the way to Kibua, with many violent incidents, including rape and killings.

        At 4:14, we cut to the inside of a MONUC armored vehicle full of Indian soldiers, driving alongside the local residents as they begin their trek. We see the Indian commander, Major Dev Panwar, on foot as he follows the convoy of villagers and communicating with his team by walkie-talkie.

Commentary: As soon as the first episode of MONUC Realites was broadcast in late 2008, the feedback was positive. Congolese TV stations even paid us the supreme compliment of giving the programs prime time exposure without charging an additional fee, and we received direct accolades from both Information Minister Lambert Mende and First Lady Olive Lembe Kabila. While we had no mechanism for measuring audience feedback, all anecdotal feedback was overwhelmingly positive, and we never had a complaint of any kind from anyone in our target audience. This was important, since the Congolese government was empowered to ask us to leave at any time.[22]

        We were curious to find out what our audience liked about our shows, so we did some informal, anecdotal research. Among other things, we were interested to learn that many Congolese viewers liked seeing visuals from different regions of their immense country; apparently their local national television stations rarely ever broadcast any material of that kind. Since we had the luxury of our own private MONUC airline, we decided to make the most of that luxury to capture what our producer Carlo Ontal called “The National Geographic appeal.”

V.9.4.  Analysis: Un Chemin vers La Paix Seme d’Embuches[23]

      While Kevin Kennedy made promotion of the MONUC mandate among the Congolese population our top priority, he also sometimes asked us to produce material for other audiences, most notably Un Chemin vers La Paix Seme d’Embuches, a 22-minute oral history of the first ten years of the MONUC Mission .Stylistically, this documentary is a conventional corporate linear historical narrative in five parts as told by participants themselves in chronological order, with dynamic visual bridges and rhythmic music to punctuate each speaker’s segment. Un Chemin Vers La Paix Seme d’Embuches is fast moving and dynamic, with a minimum of self-serving United Nations propaganda. Those interviewed do not pretend that MONUC was ever in control of the situation; rather, constantly confronted by new crises, they admit that there were many setbacks, and that they were only able to do the best they could with what resources they had. This kind of humility helps create credibility.

        Those interviewed are (or were) MONUC senior managers and decision makers; Jean-Marie Guehenno, was head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping from 2001-2008, and he tells us what is at stake when he says that the people of Congo have suffered as much as any people in the world, and that  future of the African continent is greatly dependent on what happens in Congo, thus immediately establishing what is at stake.

       Mr. Guehenno is followed by Congolese journalists Chantal Kanyimbo and Leonard Mulamba, who provide  a Congolese perspective when they describe what Congo  was like in 1999; the armies of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda were all fighting in the country, and millions of Congolese had already died because of the war. In addition, as MONUC Humanitarian Director Ross Mountain tells us that, in refugee camps around the country, 1500 Congolese were dying every day. This was Congo when MONUC was created, and a major theme of the narrative is the rapid evolution of the MONUC mission when confronted with constant new challenges.  With this constant barrage of unexpected challenges and responses, Un Chemin vers La Paix Seme d’Embuches has a fast moving and dynamic narrative.

      We  cut to the present; now, ten years after the start of the mission, MONUC Human Rights Director Leila Zerrougui explains that her job is to help the Congolese create legal institutions they can trust, MONUC Police Commander Abdallah Wafy describes how his MONUC police  are training the Congolese police to be professional law enforcement officers, and MONUC Force Commander General Babucar Gaye tells us how his UN troops are training the Congolese army to be professional soldiers. MONUC SRSG Alan Doss concludes that Security Sector reform is now the major priority, as well as the major challenge confronting the mission,

      We then see the title for Part 3: The Crises, and former SRSG William Lacey Swing, who ran MONUC from 2003-2008, sets the tone when he wryly notes that sometimes it seemed that the sole purpose of resolving any problem in the DRC was to set the stage for the next problem. In other words, the challenges kept on coming, and the mission was forced either continuously adjust to them on the spot or risk being declared a failure by the UN Security Council and the rest of the world. We then see brief glimpses of a series of violent crises – Kisangani 2003, Bunia 2003, Bukavu 2004, Kinshasa 2007, Goma 2008,  and LRA 2009. 

      Part 4 starts with the short-lived 2009 rapproachement between Rwanda and Congo, which finally offers some hope for peace and stability in the war-torn eastern Congo, and allowed SRSG Alan Doss to talk about the transformation of MONUC from a peacekeeping mission into a mission maintaining stability. 

     The title for Part 5 is The MONUC Legacy. After MONUC Director of Mission Services Hany Abdel Asiz describes how MONUC has taught many Congolese new professional skills, Radio Okapi Editor- in- Chief Leonard Mulamba reminds us how bad things were  10 years before, when there were foreign troops on Congolese soil, and the country was effectively cut into several parts. Now, as Leonard says, Congolese can travel freely from one part of the country to another. More important, now, for the first time since 1960, the Congolese people can vote to decide who will be their political leaders. Chantal Kanyimbo, Director of the Congolese Press Association, then tells us that one of MONUC’s greatest accomplishments has been the creation of a national but independent radio station whian be heard around the country – Radio Okapi.

     MONUC Human Rights Director Leila Zerrougui then adds some sobering historical context when she describes the lack of human rights under the dictatorship of Joseph Mobutu and during the wars, and she reminds us that building public faith in the judiciary and other legal institutions will take time.

      The final word, however, belongs to Jean-Marie Guehenno who says that, while the MONUC mission may be the biggest in the world, in reality it is very small when one considers what it has already accomplished. He then concludes that, in spite of what some may think, the UN cannot crush all opposition by force; quite to the contrary MONUC can only work as a humble partner with the Congolese themselves – after all, the Congo is their country.

Commentary: The aesthetic style of this production is a good example of the technocratic/corporate style; editor and graphic designer Meriton Ahmeti did a superb job of keeping the production fast moving and visually dynamic without losing any critical narrative content, and the style is factual and direct – ideal for the target audience, which was the UN Security Council, and potential donor nations.  The goal was simple: to get them to approve continued funding for the world’s most expensive UN mission.  While it is difficult to assess how much Un Chemin vers la Paix Seme d’Embuches influenced the thinking of the Security Council, the c.$1 billion annual MONUSCO budget was not cut until 2016, and judging from the subsequent positive attitude towards the MONUC Video Unit on the part of UN Management both in Kinshasa and New York, it seems safe to say this documentary was well received. In this context, it is also worth noting that this video was broadcast by all the major Congolese television stations without any adverse reactions. [24]

V.10. March, 2010- October 2010:  Olamide Adedeji, Acting Director

      Kevin Kennedy had given himself two years to put MONUC DPI in order, and he was making progress when UN Human Resources reform forced him to return to his post at UNHQ in New York 6 months ahead of schedule. This was unfortunate both for the Video Unit and DPI as a whole. Kevin was an excellent manager, and, as shall be seen, we did not have a professionally competent Director DPI after his departure.

      For example, most of us were surprised to see the late Olamide Adedeji become Acting Director DPI in early 2010. While Ms. Adedeji was a charming and literate woman who was  Head of Office in Bunia, she freely admitted to us that she had no background in communications, and that she was only filling in until Mr. Doss could find a replacement to his liking. As a result, she said, she would be reliant upon the rest of us as communications professionals until he succeeded in finding a suitable candidate. As weeks became months, this became a difficult arrangement; the situation did not improve when Olamide began to ask her good friend, Spokesperson, Madnodge Mounoubai, to give us orders on her behalf.  I objected, pointing out he was the same rank as I was, and was not qualified to be my supervisor. I won this battle – but only temporarily.

     To commemorate the 50 th anniversary of Congolese independence in 2010, MONUC was renamed MONUSCO. The changes were mostly cosmetic, but along with a new name, we had a new boss – SRSG Roger Meece, a former American ambassador to Kinshasa.  It was no secret that DRC President Joseph Kabila did not like Mr. Doss, and it was well documented that he had threatened to ask MONUSCO to leave the DRC. Since a sudden departure by MONUSCO might be catastrophic for both the country and the United Nations, many of us suspected Mr. Meece had been chosen to appease President Kabila. Indeed, lacking any UN – or any other- managerial experience, Mr. Meece was a curious choice.

     The change in both mission name and leadership had little immediate impact on our work in the Video Unit, especially not after SRSG Meece paid us a visit and told us he liked our work. After that, Olamide did not engage in our planning sessions, so Carlo and I were free to cover stories that we thought interesting with Horeb, and I personally think we did some of our best work at this time.

V.10.1. Distribution

        Technically, there were two significant improvements during this period. Congolese television went from analog to digital, which meant superior sound and picture quality. This also meant distribution by satellite, eliminating the need for VHS tapes, as well as the need to deliver them to the sectors around the country.

        Now all we had to do was to deliver DVDs of our programs to the three major stations in Kinshasa. In addition, we began to shoot on High Definition cameras, which meant a significant improvement in sound and picture quality. We could finally expect that what our Congolese audiences saw on their television sets was of a audio-visual quality similar to the product we could see on our computers.

V.10.2. Production

     To commemorate the 50^th Anniversary of Congolese Independence on June 30, we produced a historical special titled L’ONU ET LA RDC – 50 ANS DE PARTENARIAT, intended to introduce MONUSCO to the Congolese; with archival material from the first UN Mission to Congo, ONUC, we adopted an intentionally archaic style and produced 5 versions in indigenous Congolese languages.[25]

V.11. September, 2010- October, 2010:  Madnodge Mounoubai, OIC/PID

       

     True to her word, Olamide let us in Video Unit carry on the work we had started with Kevin Kennedy. Sadly, the stress of the job combined with her already poor health proved udisastrous and she suddenly passed away in August of 2010. Her good friend, Madnodge Mounoubai, MONUSCO Spokesperson, had been promoted to P-5 and Deputy Director just prior to Olamide’s death, and he became OIC when she died.

          Unfortunately, Mr. Mounoubai immediately tried to assert his authority, shouting down anyone who refused to toe his line in DPI meetings, such as when I asked if we might discuss DPI communications strategy.  Instead of answering, Mr. Mounoubai sent us a mysterious document written by an anonymous Anglophone which I felt presented a reactive, damage control approach to strategic communications which was completely at odds with the proactive approach advocated orally by Mr.  Meece in his first meeting with us. For a short time, I began to seriously resigning; life is too short to work with abusive managers. Fortunately, a new director suddenly materialized.

V.12.  November, 2010 – 24 December, 2011: George Ola-Davies, Director

     When George Ola-Davies became Director PID in November of 2010, he met with the Video Unit and made us many promises, saying, “Give me 6 months!” and we gave him our full support. Unfortunately, by the time of his departure on Christmas Eve, 2011, he had broken most of those promises. During his tenure, we had no communications strategy, no work plan, no editorial meetings, no internal communications, no transparency, and no respect for chain of command or previously established SOP. The journalist Fawaz Gerges once said of the late Moammar Qaddafi, “He destroyed all state institutions and replaced them with a cult of personality”, and the same might be said of Mr. Ola-Davies, who signed his internal emails to us “GOD” and seemed to have such faith in his supreme judgement and ability that he never had to listen to mere professionals like the rest of us. The ensuing chaos created a division run on his whim, and when he did not get his way, he could turn mean and personal.

       One of the casualties was our signature program MONUSCO REALITES, which was effectively killed when one of Mr. Ola-Davies’ friends in Budget decided that some vague and unspecified UN rules made it impossible for us to continue hiring our star Congolese reporter and fixer Horeb Bulembo, and told me I would have to hire other Congolese reporters. In the past, we had tried other Congolese television journalists, but none of them were as good as Horeb.  

      We had found a good female journalist in Roliane Yulu, but we could only use her in Kinshasa, because, for her own safety, we could not send her to war zones in the East. In short, there were no other Congolese reporters who were remotely qualified, and the fact that we had ample funds in our budget to pay Horeb was ignored by Mr. Ola-Davies.

      MONUSCO REALITES 27 was the last episode of MONUSCO REALITES with Horeb, who produced episode’s feature story on SRSG for Sexual Violence (and current Swedish Foreign Minister) Margot Wallström’s visit to Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr, Dennis Mukwege’s City of Joy project to support survivors of sexual violence.

V.12.1. Analysis: MONUSCO REALITES 27[26]

    

       Just as the differences between MONUC and MONUSCO were primarily cosmetic, the format for MONUSCO REALITES was the same as MONUC REALITES, with only two minor changes: MONUC became MONUSCO in the opening title, and editor Meriton Ahmeti created an attractive graphic sequence for the REALITES feature story of the week, which, in this case, was the opening of The City of Joy sanctuary for survivors of sexual violence in Bukavu.

      MONUSCO REALITES 27 is 9:34 minutes long, and, like MONUC REALITES, starts with the name MONUSCO PID superimposed upon the iris of an eye evocative of the old CBS logo. We move in on the iris to the sound of up-tempo drumming, and see flashes of MONUSCO Video crews shooting in the field intercut with an Academy Leader countdown. At 2 seconds, we cut to white noise and then see the pulsing name of the program: MONUSCO REALITES.

     At 11 seconds, we see presenter Babel Mpongo in studio, welcoming viewers to this week’s program, and announcing that the feature story for this week will be the grand opening of The City Of Joy for survivors of sexual violence in Bukavu. On the screen over Babel’s head, we see the words: Bukavu: “The City of Joy” opens its doors”.

    Babel tells us we will see the story after the news, and, at 30 seconds, we hear the clarion horns cuing the news segment, and we see massive bold texts announcing the news segment,

At 1:01. Babel then tells us that SRSG for Sexual Violence Margot Wallström has been visiting the DRC to talk with victims of sexual violence. We see her talking with local leaders in Kasai province, and she then tells the camera in excellent French that she has been talking with local leaders, as well as victims, and trying to learn and understand as much as possible.

      At 1:35. we cut to white noise, and another new story in the city of Mbandaka in Equateur Province, for a ceremony to survivors of the Songo Mboyo mass rapes. MONUSCO Director of Human Rights Jean-Luc Marx explains that the purpose of this ceremony is to begin a process of re-integration as well as reparations for these victims, so they can once again become production members of society.

     At 2:45, we hear the slow, evocative theme song for the Realites segment of the program, and see the new graphic introduction. At 3:00, we see Babel in the studio again as she introduces the episode on City of Joy, and explains that this is a project funded by the V-Day Movement, The Panzi Foundation and UNICEF, and is intended to help the 200,000 or more victims of sexual violence in the DRC. Celebrities who have come to Bukavu for the opening include SRSG Wallström and South African actress Charlize Theron, and that MONUSCO REALITES reporter Horeb Bulambo in Bukavu to provide us with the full story:

    At 3:47, we cut to Horeb on location at the City of Joy celebration in Bukavu. He tells us we are in Bukavu to celebrate the opening of the City of Joy, a place intended to empower victims of sexual violence, many of whom have been rejected when they have tried to re-enter society.

Behind Horeb, we see hundreds of Congolese women dancing, with some European women energetically trying to keep up with them. A few Congolese victims of sexual violence, with their faces blurred, tells Horeb in Kisswahili (with subtitles) that women in Congo are raped by solders when they go to the fields to work…

      We then cut to more dancing between Congolese and European women. At 5:13, one of the Congolese victims addresses the crowd: “Do something for us… We have pleaded, we have cried, an we have had enough…but nobody cares about us. What can we do?”

      We see SRSG Wallström sitting next to MONUSCO SRSG Leila Zerrougui, listening. At

5:30, we see Panzi Director Dr. Denis Mukwege talking, He says The City of Joy will help the Congolese women to recover and heal from their ordeals, and then we see Ambassador for Peace Charlize Theron saying that they are happy to be there supporting the women of Congo, and that,” We are turning their pain into power!”

    At 6:30, American playwright Eve Ensler, the founder of the V-Day movement, speaks. She says:” If you exploit the center of the world… If you take the minerals from the center of the world that don’t belong to you… If you take the bodies of the women of the world that don’t belong to you…If you take the hearts of the women of the world that don’t belong to you, you destroy the heart of the world!”

    SRSG Margot Wallström then speaks in English, thanking those responsible for having created The City of Joy to show the power of women. She says that The City of Joy will be an inspiration to women around the world, and that she will ensure that the UN Security Council use the tools available to stop the violence against women, men and boys.

    At 7:58, the dancing resumes, and Horeb tells us we are approaching the end of the ceremony to open The City of Joy, and that it is now time for the Congolese government to take the steps necessary to stop sexual violence in the country. He signs off at 8:31.

      We return to Babel in the Kinshasa studio, and she tells that every year The City of Joy will be providing 180 Congolese women with basic self-defense courses, family planning clinics, courses in AIDS prevention, as well as cultural courses in dance and art. The City of Joy is run and operated exclusively by women, and is intended to help the most precious resource of Congo – her women. At 9:20, Babel signs off, and we see the closing credits.

Commentary: Over two years, we produced over 100 episodes of MONUC/MONUSCO REALITES, and Horeb had been in most of them. Not only was he talented and charismatic, but he was also hard working and reliable. He was also from eastern Congo, and most of the MONUSCO military activity for us to cover was in the East. Covering the East, however, required travel, and we were allowed only 5 days of travel at a time.  While our Goma producer Carlo Ontal could be mercurial, I soon learned I could send Horeb on a 5-day trip with him and that they together would return with enough material for several episodes. In short, Horeb was invaluable, and we knew our Congolese audience loved him.  The City of Joy story was a good example. Carlo was unable to produce the story we had wanted with Charlize Theron, so he could rely on Horeb to provide both the context as well as the narrative content for the feature story. However, I was advised by PID Director George Ola-Davies that, due to some arcane UN rules, we would soon be no longer allowed to hire freelancers like Horeb. I realized that we might have to find ways to create narrative content without a reporter. MONUSCO REALITES 32, was an experiment in that direction.  A 12:24 minute special for International Women’s Day in 2011, MONUSCO REALITES 32 is the story of on a successful creative collaboration between Canadian choreographer Carmen Nicole Smith of the Battery Dance Company of New York City and the Congolese National Ballet in Kinshasa. With Meriton Ahmeti as director and editor, this feature story attempts to capture that success.

V.12.2 Analysis: MONUSCO REALITES 32[27]

      MONUSCO REALITES 32 begins with the same signature MONUSCO PID logo and academy leader countdown as all the other MONUC/MONUSCO REALITES video magazines. At 0:15, we see presenter Babel Mpongo in the studio, with a big Apple computer monitor playing a colorful abstract screen saver behind her; on the frame of the screen above her, we

see the title of this week’s show: Danser Pour le Respect (Dancing for Respect). On the frame of the screen beneath her, we see a text announcing a visit by MONUSCO SRSG Roger Meece to Bukavu. Babel tells us that this week we shall be seeing a choreographer from America working with the Congolese National Ballet. But first, the news…

    After a brief explosion of bold graphics spelling out the word “News”, at 0:35, we see Babel again in the studio. The camera lens is wider, and Babel fills the screen. The vignetting frames at the top and bottom are gone. Babel tells us that the Director of United Nations Humanitarian Services, Dame Valerie Amos, is on a official visit to Congo, and we cut to see Dame Valerie meeting with Congolese officials and MONUSCO staff in Kinshasa.

    We cut to Dame Valerie visiting Congolese refugees in a camp for internally displaced people, (or IDPs) in Province Orientale. Dame Valerie then tells us in English (with French subtitles) that she is here to examine some of the humanitarian challenges in this province.After a signature MONUSCO REALITES white noise transition, we cut back to Babel in the studio for another news item. Again, we see her full frame in the same news framing as in the previous shot. She tells us that MONUSCO SRSG Roger Meece is on a visit to South Kivu.

     

After another signature MONUSCO REALITES white noise transition, at 2:20 we hear the opening bar of the theme for the REALITES segment, and we see the graphic bridge of reporters and performers leading to the title REALITES. At 2:43, we see Babel in her news framing, and she introduces the feature, telling us that the American Embassy has brought American choreographer Carmen Nicole Smith to Kinshasa to help the Congolese National Ballet create a performance titled Danser Pour le Respect (Dancing for Respect) to celebrate International Women’s Day.

       At 3:30, we cut to shots of men drumming in silhouette, and at 3:48, we see the members of the Congolese National Ballet in rehearsal to Congolese music. At 4:14, we see a title reading Une Vie de Danseur, (The Life of a Dancer) and we hear a male voice speaking in French. We see it is one of the members of the troupe-   Akim Timba - and he talks about what dance means to him as a professional dancer.

      We then cut to members of the troupe rehearsing, which is a bridge at 4:30 to a vignette of another dancer in the troupe – Hembe Malomana – talking about what dance means to him.

Like Akim, he says that dance is his profession and his life. At 4:40, we cut to another shot of the troupe rehearsing, and at 4:51, we meet Ngolomingi Solange, another member of the troupe. She tells us she loves to dance, and at 6:02, we cut to a title card reading “ Carmen”, and then we see American choreographer Carmen Nicole Smith directing the rehearsal. With her curly red hair and lithe body, Carmen looks tiny compared to some of the powerful Congolese men and women, but, as she speaks to them in English with a translator, it is clear she has their full attention on stage. We hear one of the Congolese dancers speaking in French:

“She is professional, and we here in the national ballet are also professional. But she has had years of experience which we have not had, and that is good. She is a real professional.”

       At 6:11, we watch Carmen leading the rehearsal, and the Directeur General of the Congolese National Ballet says (in French) that, while his dancers know about dance, they  lack professional experience, and in that regard American artists like Carmen have much to offer them. We see Carmen talking with the Congolese dancers on the stage.

       We see a title reading Cooperation, and Mamie Kabongolo from the American Embassy in Kinshasa explains that the US State Department brought Carmen to the DRC as part of a cultural exchange program to bring American artists to Congo. Then we see a title reading Theme, and Kititwa Asina from the troupe tells us that the theme of this performance will the lack of respect men show women in the DRC, and that men in Congo see the women more or less as slaves. Through this performance, she says, she wants men to see women as their equals, and no longer as slaves.

         At 7:30, the Director General says that the theme will be expressed using a fish as a symbol. In some villages, when fish are caught, women are forbidden from eating certain parts of the fish, because the men want to keep the most savory parts of the fish for themselves.

         At 7:52, we see the men rehearsing the catching of the fish, and at 8:02, we see a title reading Preparations, and then we see the theatre being prepared for the premiere. We hear Carmen: There is an intense passion here, and so much talent, and its sort of bubbling all the time. It’s been great to try to harness that…

        At 8:20, we see Carmen sitting in a garden talking about her work. She says that as they approached the premiere, the quality of the performance surpassed her expectations. As she speaks, we see an up-tempo dress rehearsal on-stage. The dancers look ready.

          At 8:48, we see a title in French reading: La Nuit de Spectacle (The Night of the Performance) and then cross fade to see a packed theatre, the crowd buzzing with anticipation. On the lower left of the image, we see the date superimposed:  le 11 mars, 2011 (March 11, 2011). Back stage, we see some of the dancers in costume, warming up. We fade out at 9:30 and then fade in to see the dancers on stage performing the opening scene. The music is all live Congolese percussion, and all up tempo.

         For the next minute, we see a montage of highlights of the intense performance. At 10:30,

the performance ends to wild applause, and the dancers hold hands and bow to the audience in a traditional Western curtain call. At 10:56, we see the exuberant dancers coming off-stage,  with their ecstatic faces beaming with happiness.

         At 11:08, we see Carmen talking with the press after the performance. She says:

      “One of the reasons culture is a powerful vehicle for educating and communicating a message is because it immediately connects people on an emotional level, beyond language – and especially in a place where there are several languages, we can find a common humanity and explore specific issues through the language of culture, and the language of dance. Dance and music are particularly powerful here in the DRC because they are such a part of the tradition here…”

         At 11:47, we cut to a MONUSCO REALITES white noise transition, and the feature story is over. We then return to presenter Babel Mpongo in the studio, this time with the same shot and vignette framing as in the opening shot, with texts at the top and bottom. Babel signs off and the MONUSCO REALITES 32 is over at 12:04.

Commentary: The narrative content of MONUSCO REALITES 32 was one of the best stories we ever had a chance to cover. The American Embassy had brought over choreographer Carmen Nicole Smith from New York to work with the Congolese National Ballet, which had not had a performance in over a decade. The result was a ballet titled DANCER POUR LE RESPECT, with the premiere on International Women's Day.  The rehearsals were a classic example of a positive collaboration, and the show was a great hit for the Congolese audience. It was also a big hit for us, and one of the last MONUSCO REALITES programs we were able to produce. As mentioned, in Kinshasa, we were experimenting with doing feature stories without reporters. Editor and director Meriton Ahmeti found a way to tell this story through interviews with participants using scenes from rehearsals as B-roll and for transitions. Choreographer Carmen Nicole Smith is both articulate and charismatic, and had excellent rapport with the Congolese dance troupe as they put together the first ballet performed in Kinshasa in over a decade, and were rewarded with an overwhelmingly positive audience response.  The editing style featuring title cards announcing each segment is formal and respectful, and entirely appropriate for the subject of Congolese high culture. In her closing statement, choreographer Carmen Nicole Smith sums up the theme of the value of cross-cultural exchanges perfectly. As a special for International Women’s Day, MONUSCO REALITES 32 worked perfectly.

       However, while we were happy with the results, the production was so time-consuming that we realized we would not be able to regularly produce enough quality features to feed our weekly program without Horeb. After much internal deliberation, I decided with the editors that we would have to cease production of MONUSCO REALITES and find a new format for our weekly program.  While we were developing the new format, we found a Congolese reporter named Roliane Yulu who had a talent for human interest stories, particularly with children. MONUSCO REALITES 38 about the Kinshasa Violin School was the best. Unfortunately, MONUSCO Security would not allow us to send Roliane on assignments to the East; it simply would have been too dangerous for her.

V.12.3. Analysis: MONUSCO REALITES 38[28]

     At 14:32 minutes, MONUSCO REALITES 38 has a feature story about the Kinshasa Violin School, an extraordinary institution run by evangelical missionaries devoted to teaching classical violin technique to the children of Kinshasa’s elite Congolese families.

      The program starts with the same signature logo and music as all other MONUSCO Realites

Episodes. At 0:11, we see presenter Tina Salama in the studio, greeting the viewers and announcing that the feature story this week will be about The Child Violinists of Kinshasa, and we see that title running across the screen over her head. Below her, we see a text with a news item from the province of Katanga: MONUSCO and the Diocesan Commission of Justice and Peace identifies 72 victims of mass rapes committed by the FDLR in several villages in the North of the province.

       At 0:29, Tina announces the news segment, and we hear the signature music and see the

bold and dynamic fonts announcing the News. At 0:34, Tina begins to tell us the primary news stories of the week:

         Thanks to support from MONUSCO, 3000 members of the Police Rapid Deployment Force completed their training…

         We see unformed police on review as they parade past a Congolese police chief and his MONUSCO colleague, General Abdallah Wafy, and we hear music. Tina continues:

         With their 6- month training complete, these police will now take up their duties in their homes in Kisangani and Bas-Congo…

          We see the police marching to the music carrying their weapons and a Congolese flag.

MONUSCO Police Commander General Abdallah Wafy addresses those present:

          This training has been provided by MONUSCO as part of our mandate to support the 2011 Presidential elections…

         At 1:22, we cut to a white noise transition, and we see Tina with a second news item:

         Elements of the MONUSCO maritime brigade Riverine have been conducting an operation with their colleagues from the Congolese army…

         We see MONUSCO maritime troops from Uruguay on patrol in their hydrofoils on Lake Kivu as Tina explains the purpose of their operation is to find the bodies of the victims of a boat accident in the lake. We see Lake Kivu through the windows of a MONUSCO helicopter as the search for victims continues below on the water. Tina says the boat carried both passengers and commercial cargo. A Riverine commander from Uruguay describes the operation in Spanish with French subtitles. He says that as soon as they heard about the accident, they left Goma to look for the boat, which had capsized 24 hours earlier on the way from Bukavu to Goma, but  they had been unable to find the accident.

.

        At 2:35, we cut to another white noise transition, which dissolves into the music and montage of graphics and images announcing the feature segment, or Realites. At 2:56, we see

Tina back in the studio, this time from a side angle, as she introduces the subject – The Kinshasa Violin School. She tells us that the school is a project run by the New Apostolic Church, and is designed to teach young people how to appreciate and perform classical music.

        At 3:08, we cut to MONUSCO REALITES reporter Roliane Yulu walking towards us on a quiet Kinshasa street in a residential neighborhood. Roliane tells us we are now in Kinshasa, and we are about to discover something unexpected behind the walls to her back – the sound of children playing the violin. We hear the faint sound of violins playing classical music, and then follow Roliane in a continuous take through a door into a courtyard, and the sound grows louder. At 3:34, we see our first young violinist, and then several other violinists in the courtyard – all playing a famous piece of classical music in unison. The violinists are both boys and girls, with most of them in their early teens, and some even younger.

      At 4:08, we cut to a girl practicing a piece of classical music indoors. At 4:21, we cut to a very young girl practicing her scales. We hear her voice as she gives her name, and then see her at 4:41 with Roliane, who asks her when she started to play the violin.

     “I started to play when I was six years old, “answers the little girl.

     Roliane then asks her to read some notes on some sheet music, and the little girl sings the name of each note aloud. Roliane then asks her if she sees violin as a friend, and the girl answers, “Yes – as a friend.”

     And when Roliane asks her how she would feel if someone told her she could not play any more, the little girl answers that she would be “sad – very sad…”

    At 6:30, we see other students practicing, and then we see main instructor, Professeur Remy. He tells us that he teaches his students how to play refined music- the classical music found in churches and conservatories around the world. Roliane then suggests the students learn other things in the process, like patience and a spiritual harmony. Professeur Remy agrees, adding that the students also learn to play together and to attain a higher quality of sound, which is good for their school work as well.

    At 7:27, we cut to a boy practicing the opening notes to Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. He is struggling, but does not give up. At 7:55, we see three older boys practicing another piece together; they are clearly a few levels higher than the first boy. Professeur Remy speaks off-camera:

   “Life can be difficult here in Kinshasa, but for our children and their parents, life is still beautiful because the parents are familiar with many of the songs the children play. These are songs from church, and when the children play these songs, there is peace throughout the house, there is calm and there is even joy…”

    At 8:55, Roliane asks Professeur Remy how the children see their violins, and he answers that they view them as their brothers, sisters and friends.

    At 9:15, we see a young boy playing the opening notes of the popular Christmas carol Jingle Bells. Roliane asks him if he would rather play the violin, or play with cars like other little boys. He answers he would rather play his violin, because playing makes him feel good.

    At 10:38. Roliane introduces us to an older boy, and Professeur Remy tells us he is going to play one of the most difficult pieces for us – the concerto – and says the boy is going to play a solo for us. He gives the boy final instructions, and the boy starts playing at 11:26.

   We see the boy playing alone, and then cut to a close-up of him playing at 11:46. His face exudes calm concentration as he successfully navigates through the many notes without any apparent mistakes.

    At 12:16, we see Mike, who runs the school on behalf of the Neo-Apostolic Church, and he says instrumental and choral music are important parts of their church activities, and that they have about 20 students in Kinshasa, and another 15-17 at Makala.

    At 13:16, we see all the students playing a famous Bach Christmas piece together, and at 13:41, Roliane enters the frame and signs off, saying one can find peace in music, and that is something to think about…

  At 13:59, we cut to the MONUSCO REALITES logo, with the signature beep, and at 14:00, we see presenter Tina Salama back in the studio. Tina signs off, and we see the closing credits.

Commentary: With a total length of 14:32, MONUSCO REALITES 38, with the feature story directed by Alan Brain on the Kinshasa Violin School, was the longest edition of MONUSCO REALITES we ever produced, and was well over our target length of 10 minutes. As previously noted, MONUSCO purchased 30 minutes of weekly air time on all the major Congolese TV stations, and that meant 3 weekly broadcasts of a program shorter than 10 minutes. We had no idea what would happen with a program of more than 14 minutes. However, we noted that the stations had broadcast MONUSCO REALITES 30 three times, even though it was more than 12 minutes long, so I decided MONUSCO REALITES 38 was so good it was worth a risk. MONUSCO REALITES 38 ran a three times for a total of 44 minutes, and we heard later from our contact at the RTNC, the Congolese government television station, that then Congolese President Joseph Kabila had called them to ask them to broadcast the program again because he had missed it and wanted to see it. I have no way of verifying this story, but I do know that the television stations had been airing MONUSCO REALITES in prime- time evening hours for no extra charge simply because viewers liked it. This was significant, because the terms of our broadcast agreement allowed the Congolese to decide when to air our programs, an , when I arrived at the end of 2007, they   had been broadcasting La Semaine en Bref in the notoriously dead hours of either late at night or early in the morning.

 This positive institutional response to MONUSCO REALITES was an indication to me that we were doing something right, and I believe MONUSCO REALITES 38 is an excellent example of why our approach was successful. In the Kinshasa Violin School story, we are showing the Congolese a side of themselves they liked to see – and without any patronizing UN presence.

Instead, we are showing the future generation of young Congolese seriously developing their

creative talents on their own, and, since we are watching them play music, the impact is emotional as well as cerebral.

V.12.4. The 2011 Congolese Presidential Elections

     The major event on the MONUSCO calendar in 2011 was the Congolese Presidential elections. MONUSCO Video Unit  had been expecting a heavy workload covering the event for our UNTV colleagues with the UN news service UNIFEED back in New York, but we also wanted to produce some music videos promoting suitably positive election messages encouraging people to vote and estimated each video would cost around $5,000 for talent, which was well within our $200,000 yearly budget for talent. However, Director DPI George Ola-Davies vetoed our video productions, and instead gave us orders to serve as a production arm for the DRC Election Organization CENI, and produce a series of videos the CENI had scripted in 5 local Congolese languages. I was appalled, both for ethical and qualitative reasons. First, CENI was considered by most Congolese to be pro-President Kabila, and I had thought we were supposed to be strictly neutral. Second, as an award-winning professional producer and screenwriter, I was confident we could produce far better material than any sketches written by anyone working for the CENI. There was also a potentially serious breach of Security. What with the controversy surrounding the Elections, how could we have someone from the CENI working in the Spokesperson’s Office? What if, for example, the MONUSCO Administration decided to criticize the CENI?

    After we had finished producing the 5 language versions of the three fifteen-minute sketches, I learned that Mr. Ola-Davies had secretly produced his own music video without informing us. When he then asked us to dupe his video, I made a copy and gave it to the Office of Internal Investigations, who subsequently discovered that the Director had paid some popular Congolese music stars $82,000 from our $200,000 yearly budget for talent, and then paid the Congolese television stations another $80,000. from our yearly budget for distribution.

     I was furious, and asked OIS to pursue their investigations. They apparently did, because Mr. Ola-Davies reign was suddenly cut short when he was officially terminated by MONUSCO on 24 December, 2011. We were never given an official explanation for his sudden termination.[29]

V.13.  24 December, 2011- 21 January, 2012:  Ted Folke, OIC

     As the senior information officer at the time of Mr. Ola-Davies’ sudden departure, I was unexpectedly appointed OIC/DPI by Chief of Staff Ola Almgren. While the Christmas holidays were usually quiet in Kinshasa, the 2011 post electoral period proved sensitive, as many Congolese clearly felt we had helped President Joseph Kabila win what had been an obviously rigged election.  Our challenge was to explain that, while nearly all international observers agreed that the elections had not been credible, our mandate explicitly limited our role to one of logistical support. The Congolese Government had done us no favors by suggesting that MONUSCO had actively participated in every aspect of the elections, thereby making us apparent accomplices to the electoral fraud.  Furthermore, President Kabila was not popular in Kinshasa, and, for the first time, I felt hostility on the street from the local population.

V.13.1. Production

     What with the post-election turmoil, SRSG Roger Meece decided this was a good time to take an extended Christmas holiday, so I found myself working directly with DSRSG Leila Zerrougui, who was head of mission in Meece’s absence. Madame Zerrougui and I  agreed that we did not want MONUSCO to be in the position of trying to defend the indefensible by defending the elections themselves;  all we could do was hope that the moment would pass, and that public attention would return to the bulwark of our mandate, which was Protection of Civilians. I arranged for a Radio Okapi interview with Madame Zerrougui to explain the MONUSCO Mandate as it pertained to the elections; Madame Zerrougui was superb, clearly explaining what our job was, and what it was not. We recorded the interview and sent copies around the DRC through the Outreach Unit.

         Otherwise, as mentioned, I had been forced to admit we could not produce enough quality features to feed MONUSCO Realites on a weekly basis, so I resigned myself to creating a new format with editor and graphic designer Meriton Ahmeti. The result, ONU NEWS, was a glossy, Fox News- style video magazine featuring our excellent cadre of presenters from Radio Okapi., However , I was not happy with our lack of documentary coverage from the field, I confess that the taste of Monty Python in Meriton Ahmeti’s bold graphics was not accidental.

       However, as OIC/DPI,  I had absolute power of program approval, so I took advantage of this opportunity to produce feature stories I had wanted to make for a long time – including one on an American hip hop artist named Van T. Monroe whom the American embassy brought over to teach Congolese design students at L’Ecole des Beaux Arts how to create sneaker art against sexual violence.

V.14. 21 January, 2012- 12 July, 2012:  Madnodge Mounoubai, OIC

      For reasons that were never clear to me, our anticipated new director never materialized in January; instead, we found ourselves again under the harsh rule of my old adversary OIC/Spokesperson Madnodge Mounoubai. Although I was his de facto deputy, and had been recommended for a 6-month extension by COS Ola Almgren as “irreplaceable,” I was summarily cut out of the loop on all matters, including replacement of video personnel. Told to submit my recommendations for the Video Unit in my Mission End Report, I retired from MONUSCO without further ado on 30 June, 2012.

V.15.  Conclusions

     What follows here are some of my observations regarding what I considered to be issues pertinent to the functioning of the MONUSCO Video Unit during my tenure 2007-2012 Some involve media philosophy, some are technical, and some others are organizational. All are relevant to the functioning of the MONUSCO Video Unit. These observations will be followed by my conclusions.

V.2.15.1. Media Philosophy

     Here I would like to focus on some fundamental communications issues universal to all missions. I have been working with film and video for the United Nations since 1976, though hardly exclusively. Over these years, I have noticed a fundamental question afflicting most UN information efforts - namely, do UN Information agencies produce news or strategic communications?

     This question is critical, since it affects the production process from concept through to consumption. For reasons both personal and professional. many UN information officers prefer to think they are doing news rather than strategic communications. I believe this is a fundamental mistake.

      First of all, for both political and professional reasons, the UN cannot do news. News requires freedom from political control, as well as the ability to be self-critical. News also requires a high-speed production capacity the UN lacks. Acceptance of these limitations need not be a handicap. Quite to the contrary, an acceptance of limitations allows creative minds to find creative solutions.  The reality is that the United Nations is a political organization with political goals. To help achieve these goals, the UN must develop communications strategies that help convince large segments of the population that these political goals are in their interest, and are therefore worth supporting. In a Mission like MONUSCO, the administration must determine with Director DPI what key messages should be conveyed, and Director DPI should enlist the creative skills of the entire Division to determine how to most effectively convey these messages.

         This is the way we worked when Kevin Kennedy was Director, DPI, and his approach was very successful. He gave us the messages, and then challenged us to find the best ways to express it. As a result, we all became involved in the task of promoting the mission, and our attention was focused on finding creative solutions. In retrospect, we were fortunate in that Kevin was supportive as well as demanding, and that we felt we could trust both his judgement and his professionalism.

           As a result, in terms of media philosophy, this meant we could be progressive both in terms of our narrative content as well as our exploration of some of the possibilities of New Media form. In this regard, while MONUSCO Video Unit was consciously following in the Kino-Eye tradition of Soviet documentary pioneer Dziga Vertov, I now realize MONUSCO REALITES was a stylistic example of what contemporary New Media advocate Lev Manovich calls Soft Cinema .[30] In terms of form, we were making every effort to push the envelope in terms of digital media, while simultaneously finding ways to touch Congolese hearts as well as minds in our choices of narrative content. In the process, I discovered that the Congolese were a far more sophisticated audience than some of my colleagues thought.

        Superficially, we were well aware of all that the country had been through – as former DPKO head Jean-Marie Guehenno says in the opening of Un Chemin Vers La Paix Seme d’Embuches, in the previous two decades, the Congolese had suffered perhaps more than any other people in the world. It was my belief that our intended audience would appreciate whatever we could do to give them hope and boost their self-respect. In the process, I theorized that audience would inevitably be more appreciative of MONUSCO’s contributions to the country while simultaneously hoping the mission would leave their country as soon as possible. As DSRSG Leila Zerrougui had told me in a later interview., no country in the world wants to be the host nation for a United Nations peacekeeping mission .

      In the context of MONUSCO REALITES, this meant positive feature stories like The Kinshasa Violin School would make viewers more receptive to the news items embedded in the first part of the program. In short, this is a classic example of the American Hearts and Minds strategy from the Vietnam War: if you want to win over a population, you need to appeal to their hearts as well as their minds. Conversely, if you don’t win their hearts, they probably won’t pay any attention to anything you have to say.

      In short, we had enough respect for our intended Congolese audience to avoid the patronizing La Didactique style of propaganda and instead attempt to engage them with progressive form as well as content. Happily enough, the Congolese audience consistently responded favorably to our efforts.

V.15.2. Video Unit Personnel

     Here I would like to express my humble appreciation to the Video Unit team for the support they provided during my tenure.  They were all highly skilled video professionals from a variety of countries and those responsible for the creation of this group deserve praise – particularly my predecessor Yasmina Bouziane.  The only missing link when I arrived was organization and managerial vision, and, as an experienced film and television director and producer, I think I was able to provide some of both.

       I might add that my recruitment was an example of the frequently maligned UN Human Resource Department actually working. I knew no one in MONUC DPI prior to arrival, and went through the standard recruitment process. I believe special mention should be given to the late Carlos da Costa, who recruited me for UNTAET in 2000, and who recommended me. to Hamanyoun Mubtakir, who recruited me for MONUC While I was very much the outside candidate, I managed to get the job anyway, through a unanimous panel decision.

      That much said, while I was fortunate to find both a talented and highly skilled team in Video Unit on my arrival at the end of 2007, I subsequently found it difficult to hire any new staff, or even replace older ones when they became ill or left.

     For example, I found the decision by MONUSCO Budget Department in 2011 to make it impossible for Video Unit to hire our freelance Congolese reporter Horeb Bulambo to be inexplicable.  We had plenty of money in our budget to pay freelance Congolese talent, so the 2011 Budget Department objections made no sense whatsoever. Hard working, reliable and articulate, Horeb was simply an invaluable member of our Video Unit team, and, along with our brilliant presenters Tina Salama and Babel Mpongo, Horeb was the Congolese voice and face of the mission for many Congolese around the DRC. Our colleagues from Budget added insult to injury by insisting that we pay Horeb at the same meagre rates MONUSCO paid the Congolese who washed our cars and cleaned our offices.

      This obstructionism effectively killed MONUSCO REALITES at a critical moment just before the elections. I had just been in meetings in New York with UNTV colleagues Caroline Petit and UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric, who both liked MONUSCO REALITES, and wanted to set up free distribution deal for the program with the Belgian RTBF, which wanted to broadcast MONUSCO REALITES for free in Europe, thereby reaching the Congolese diaspora and others. This would have exponentially increased our audience, which, based on television ownership, was an estimated c. 30 % of the DRC population. Inexplicably, Director George Ola-Davies gave us no support, and an exciting and promising opportunity withered on the vine, along with our flagship program.

V.16. Challenges

     In any creative or professional situation, there are going to be challenges. Here is a list of some of the challenges I encountered during my tenure as Chief, MONUSCO Video Unit..

V.16.1.  Technical Challenges

      During my 5 years as Chief, Video Unit, Video Unit always had a challenging relationship with MONUSCO Information Technology Services, better known as CITS. Like the rest of the mission, we were almost completely dependent upon CITS for all internet services, and unfortunately, we rarely received the support we needed to do our jobs properly.

        For example, File Transfer Protocol, or FTP, has been the industry standard for electronic transmission of video material for several years now, but we were never able to get it functional. The problem was a lack of band-width; video, being an information intensive medium, requires far more bandwidth than audio or print, and CITS refused to give it to us.[31] After many fruitless discussions with the CITS hierarchy, I recommended a privately paid, dedicated line for FTP transmission from Goma to Kinshasa. It would have cost about $300 per month, and we had funds in our Video budget to cover the expense. CITS then told us having a private server was against UN rules.

       As a result, we were forced to send tapes by hand from Goma to Kinshasa several times a week, which put us in direct violation of MOVCON rules stating that we could not carry even small items on our aircraft. I nonetheless authorized this practice – with the tacit approval of the Chief of Transport, once he understood our predicament.  

      Likewise, as mentioned, the CITS mission-wide ban on YouTube made it impossible for UN staff to see our weekly programs on our YouTube channel. As a result, we had to send our programs by MONUSCO CITS Intranet to our colleagues, but many colleagues could not open the files, and they would then complain to me. I could only direct them to the CITS Helpdesk. I felt it was important that our colleagues around the country had some idea about what was going on in the rest of the mission, so this unresolved problem was a great source of frustration.

     Our YouTube and Facebook platforms were essential to getting our message out to the external world, and we turned to CITS for assistance to make it possible to upload our programs from our office computers.  Once again, we received no assistance, so we did all of the uploading at home on our private servers, at our own expense. It was worth every penny. The so-called UN rules that prevented us from getting a dedicated server were always a mystery. Indeed, our solution would have been far more cost effective than the expensive BGAN option proposed by CITS, which would have cost at least $3000 or more per week, depending upon the number of transmissions. [32]

       In this context, it is worth noting that our sister radio station, Radio Okapi, managed avoid all the problems we had with CITS by simply having their own Radio Okapi Technical Unit under the leadership of Canadian Georges Schleger. The role of this unit in building the radio network needed for national broadcast in the DRC was critical, since without a sustainable network, national broadcasts would have been impossible. In short, thanks to the Technical Unit, Radio Okapi was never dependent upon MONUSCO CITS for technical support, so Radio Okapi was able to avoid technical problems of the kind I have previously described.

      There can be no doubt that Radio Okapi is the jewel in the crown of all DPKO communications efforts. In my view, the secret to Radio Okapi’s success was that it has been a joint venture between MONUSCO and the Swiss Fondation Hirondelle, rather than a UN- run or managed entity.As a result, Radio Okapi, though ostensibly under UN supervision, ran its own affairs, with the assistance of some Hirondelle consultants. described. It is also important to emphasize that with its main offices under the armed protection of the MONUSCO Mission in Kinshasa, Radio Okapi has also been able to resist Congolese government attempts at intimidation over the years. In the sectors, however, some Radio Okapi reporters have been less fortunate, and some have even been killed.

V.16.2.  The UN in the Age of New Media

     While most pundits and media experts recognize we live in the Age of New Media , and are in the midst of a Digital Revolution which is changing our lives in more ways than we can possibly be aware of, much of the United Nations remains mired in the Age of Print, and is, in communications and media terms, half a century behind the modern world.

     Since the UN is a political organization, this emphasis on print and words is understandable. After all, nations have gone to war over differing interpretations of words in treaties. However, this focus on words makes the UN often blind to the power of images, and keeps the UN way behind the curve when it comes to New Media and Convergence Culture. One of the major obstacles is the media culture of the UN itself, which the author feels is anachronistic and promotes what the author calls the Damage Control School of Strategic Communications.[33]

     Be that as it may, in the rest of the world, regardless of political leanings, successful professional practitioners of propaganda and mass marketing from Josef Goebbels to Gene Lakoff have been  in complete agreement for decades that images are far more powerful than words. The billions upon billions of dollars now being spent on corporate branding and political campaigns are tangible proof that the consensus is that images, not words, are the way to people’s hearts, and that, above all, successful strategic communications campaigns should never be boring.

      In the author’s view, the UN no longer attracts the creative multimedia artists who could produce quality work to promote the organization and this is  a fundamental problem. For example, current UN Human Resource policies make it impossible to hire any creative artist on a short-term contract. If a UN staff member wants to freshen up his or her creative skills working with artists outside the organization, he or she has to return to the organization after 6 months or else lose his or her post permanently. Once out, it seems difficult to get back into the system, as some of my former Video Unit staff discovered.

      There is also the issue of Institutional Memory. The MONUSCO Video Unit has been covering mission activities for almost two decades, and we had an impressive collection of material in our Video Archive which I found invaluable when making historical videos like our oral history of MONUC and our special history of the mission for La Cinquintenaire – the 50^th Anniversary of Congolese Independence in 2010.

       We were also mandated to assist foreign journalists who came to the DRC to do stories on UN activities free of charge; the Video Archive enabled us to provide them with high quality b-roll material while they were in Kinshasa, and thus save them considerable time and money.

While the Video Archive might have appeared chaotic to the untrained eye, thanks to our Screenwriter Ado Abdou and Fabrice Badibanga, we had a written description of all material on file, and we knew where to find the corresponding cassettes.

        In short, the Video Archive was a great asset, and I was dismayed shortly before my departure in 2012 when DPKO decided to ship all of our material to some unknown destination at the DPKO Hub in Entebbe, Uganda. The official justification for moving this material was to keep it in a “safe place”, but, since we had no one representing MONUSCO Video Unit in Entebbe, in reality, this meant the material would be lost forever. I voiced my objections, but since the decision had been made in New York, I was ignored.

In an attempt to rectify some of these problems, here are some recommendations:

       1. Directors of Public Information, first and foremost, need to be acquainted with modern communications theory. It also helps if they have some knowledge of media production management, as well as experience in managing the creative talent actually doing the work on the ground.

       2.Conversely, since Spokespersons are primarily performers who can deftly articulate the party line on short notice and sometimes under great pressure, they are seldom also good listeners or innovative managers. Accordingly, the Spokesperson and the Director DPI should be different people, since there are few individuals possessing the ability to be good performers and good listeners.

       3. Since News requires freedom from direct political control as well as a high-speed, professional production capacity financed by a budget which the United Nations lacks, UN Peacekeeping should focus on a short term strategy as part of a larger campaign of strategic communications  which manufactures consent on issues the United Nations considers important, such as the promotion of peace and peacekeeping missions.

        4. Simultaneously, as a long term strategy, the United Nations should actively promote capacity building in the host countries so that they can produce their own media to reach their own populations. New Media makes it possible to produce video cheaply, so DPKO missions should focus on Capacity Building on missions around the world. In this regard, I am in complete agreement with Paragraph 309 from the UN High Level Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations:“ With respect to strategic communications, the Panel recommends that, at every stage of the mission life cycle, the Secretariat and missions put in place strategies for the planning, recruitment and resourcing of mission communications teams ensuring interactive two-way communications with the local population and ensuring that United Nations peace operations use modern and appropriate communications approaches and technologies.”[34]

V.16.3. Post Scriptum

         To conclude on a personal note, as a film and video producer with several decades of international experience both inside and outside the United Nations system, I found my experience as Chief, MONUSCO Video Unit to be both rewarding and fulfilling. To be sure, there were challenges, but this is normal in every professional situation.

         What was most meaningful to me was that I was given the opportunity to do some high-quality work with talented colleagues – work that I am still proud of, and that will hopefully be useful to the Congolese people and to my DPKO colleagues in future peacekeeping missions. Come what may, I shall always be more than happy to share my experiences and whatever I have learned with DPKO colleagues in the future.  In my humble opinion, we all need to share our experiences and learn from each other.

       For me, my work as a UN Peacekeeper has been both an honor and a privilege.

        As they say in Timor-Leste, “A luta continua

Appendix A: Notes

[1] Interview by author with UNUSG Herve Ladsous, Jan, 20, 2017 https://vimeo.com/168410680

2 Meisler, Stanley (A History of the United Nations, Revised Edition) Grove Press, New York, 2011.p.286

3 Lehman, Ingrid, (Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire)  Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1999 . p. 151

4 monusco.unmissions.org

5 As Chief, Video Unit, I was a P-4, Step 10, in the UN bureaucratic hierarchy, which made me the ranking Unit Chief in the Department of Public Information..

6 While MONUC tolerated critics, media activities that might put Congolese civilians at risk were not acceptable. An example was an American documentarian who had made a film about Congolese survivors of sexual violence, and who then returned without warning to show the films in the victims’ villages for the purpose of making a sequel.  Wittingly or unwittingly, she was endangering the lives of the survivors for her own personal gain, and she had done so without notifying either MONUC or the Congolese authorities. As soon as we found out what she was doing, she was deported by the Congolese authorities.

7 I quickly discovered that any non-Congolese filming on the streets of Kinshasa without a government “permit” could be subjected to an exorbitant street tax levied by the local police, or the PNC I learned to avoid this headache by having a few PNC officers on retainer to accompany our crews with their AK-47s.

8 This Systems contract enabled us to have working equipment at all times in a country with no repair services. At that time, we used Final Cut Pro 9. When Apple tried to introduce Final Cut Pro 10, we found it had problems, so we stuck with Final Cut Pro 9.

9 For La Semaine en Bref, please here:  https://vimeo.com/225650074

10 For ONU Reportages on Congolese police, please click here: https://vimeo.com/225649573

11  For Miriam Makeba PSA, please click here: https://vimeo.com/225633264

12  For Heart of Africa, please click here: https://vimeo.com/72934713

13  Somehow Mr. Lambert Mende had my private cellphone number, but I only heard from him once – and that was to tell me that President Kabila had liked a show so much he had asked the television station to re-broadcast it. Otherwise, I heard many rumors of Congolese government surveillance of our activities – including electronic bugging and Old School honey traps, but I never experienced any of them. Basically, I thought my job was to emphasize UN and Congolese solutions to the many problems the country was having, though I tried to show Congolese solutions created by the Congolese themselves whenever possible. That much said, we certainly also wanted to avoid embarrassing the Congolese authorities, since they could always ask us to leave their country.

For MONUC Human Rights, please click here: https://vimeo.com/154673345

14  For MONUC Human Rights, please click here: https://vimeo.com/154673345

15 For Le Professeur Repond! please click here: https://vimeo.com/72787708

16 A Congolese mime named Mira Mihkenza  produced a popular music video tribute to Mr. Swing titled Coco Souing , in which he played Mr. Swing in white face: https://vimeo.com/156480858

17  www.YouTube.com/ MONUCVIDEO still exists with all the programs MONUC Video Unit produced while the author was Chief (2007-2012)

18 Unfortunately, this did not include payment, since UN rules would not allow it. To ensure a smooth production schedule, I discretely paid each presenter a.  small stipend. Since we had nothing like a dressing room, the presenters took care of their own costumes and make-up in the humble DPI lavatory, and, over four years, they always showed up on time, they always knew their lines, and they always looked stylish and professional. In short, they were a producer’s dream, and I am forever in their debt.

19 For MONUC REALITES 45, please click here: https://vimeo.com/262134097

20 It worth noting here that the Indian Films Division was created after Indian independence in 1948 by John Grierson’s protégé James Beveridge, who was one of the author’s hosts when he visited India in 1979.

22 For MONUC REALITES 70, please click here: https://vimeo.com/192881324

23 For Un Chemin vers la Paix seme d’Embuches, please click here : https://vimeo.com/72316065

24  In this context, the author would like to note, that while Kevin Kennedy liked to describe the style of our productions as corporate video, I preferred the military term psy-ops, or just the classic World War I term propaganda. My good friend and colleague, the late Steve Whitehouse, disliked all three terms; ever the newsman, Steve coined the term developmental news.

25 For 50 Ans de Partenariat, please click here: https://vimeo.com/160819188

26 For MONUSCO REALITES 27, please click here: https://vimeo.com/197121708

27 For MONUSCO REALITES 32, please click here: https://vimeo.com/74491611[1] 28

28  For MONUSCO REALITES 38, please click here: https://vimeo.com/167186712

29 For the $82,000 video please click here: https://vimeo.com/281156064

Password: Dzigzvertov1

30 Manovich, Lev and Kratky, Andreas (Soft Cinema; Navigating the Database. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005)

32When I first arrived in Kinshasa, I was told the Chief of CITS was popularly known as Dr. No. I soon understood why.

33 In the author’s imagination, here are the main tenets of this negative approach:

1.     The first rule of The Damage-Control School of Public Information is that all criticisms, no matter how inane, must be rebutted.

2.     Rule #2 is that the worst thing one can do is to make a mistake, and that, therefore, all texts need to be thoroughly vetted and revised, as often as possible.

3.     Rule #3 states that the safest way to deal with any subject in video is to: Have a thoroughly vetted narration

4.      To show a VIP soundbite, since the VIP can then take the blame if something goes wrong – and he or she will be happy to be seen on camera, which is usually money in the bank for the Director, DPI.

5.     While most communicators agree that being boring is a bad idea. the deadly secret of the Damage -Control School of Public Information is that being boring is not necessarily such a bad thing, just so long as the boss is happy. Indeed, if the program is boring, fewer people will watch it and there is less of a chance something can go wrong.

Appendix B: 2015 Report of the United Nations High-Level Panel for Review of Peacekeeping Operations/Strategic Communications

On June 17, 2015, the Report of the United Nations High-Level Panel for Review of Peacekeeping Operations identified a number of problems in the area of Strategic Communications. Here are some of the key paragraphs:

“306. United Nations peace operations often struggle to communicate their messages to the local population and the broader global community. Sometimes peace operations are slow and reactive in getting their messages out; at other times the messages are convoluted or obscure. Still at other times, peace operations appear mute and introverted, which conveys its own very particular message. Communicating strategically with the local population, parties to conflict, regional and other international actors and partners on the ground is a critical component of an effective political strategy. This requires understanding key audiences and reaching out to them with messages that make sense to them and reflect their reality.

307. The outdated public information approach of the United Nations must be transformed into more dynamic communications efforts that reinforce the overall political approach and the role of the mission. A better understanding of key audiences will help to identify appropriate means of communication; the role of national staff and national communication experts is essential to this. Embracing communication methods that are now standard practice elsewhere is critical if United Nations peace operations want to be relevant in a fast-moving world. Missions should embrace cost-effective and well-tested technologies to enhance communications. More effective use of digital media should generate feedback on the mission and its communication effort and help to fine-tune messaging. Missions should ensure that mid-level and senior leaders are trained as effective communicators and are able to relate to and be understood by the local population. Senior mission leaders should be supported by communications experts.

308. All peace operations should prioritize the development of tailored and dynamic communications strategies that support mandate implementation. The strategies should maximize relevant communication tools for particular audiences, with a particular understanding of the importance of radio for many host populations and of social media for youth. Senior mission leadership, including uniformed personnel, should proactively and directly engage in meeting with people across the country. This will not only help the local population to better understand the mandate of the mission and its activities but also serve to build trust and a sense that the United Nations is with them. Missions should use modern technology and ensure that they are supported by personnel capable of carrying out strategic communications, instead of one-way information dissemination. The Panel believes that the integrity and good performance of mission personnel is the most effective tool of communication with the people of the host country

309. With respect to strategic communications, the Panel recommends that, at every stage of the mission life cycle, the Secretariat and missions put in place strategies for the planning, recruitment and resourcing of mission communications teams aimed at ensuring interactive two-way communications with the local population and ensuring that United Nations peace operations use modern and appropriate communications approaches and technologies..

 Appendix C:       Theodore Folke’s Mission End Report

Mission End Report

Name: THEODORE FOLKE

Title of position:  CHIEF, VIDEO UNIT, MONUSCO

Date of End of Assignment Report: 23 JULY , 2012

PART I: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF 56 MONTHS AS CHIEF OF MONUC/MONUSCO VIDEO UNIT:

Since MONUC/MONUSCO Video Unit operated under direct supervision of Director P.I.D, and was totally dependent upon Director P.I.D.’s interpretation of the Mandate, I shall divide my tenure into 7 parts, each one representing a different Director/O.I.C. P.I.D. By any standards, however, 7 different directors over the course of 56 months is a very high management turnover. As shall be seen, this instability of senior management made continuity of mandate interpretation and communications strategy more than difficult.

25 November, 2007-August, 2008 I began my assignment in Kinshasa as Chief of the MONUC Video Unit. My first supervisor was Mario Zamorano, Director, Division of Public Information, and Willam Lacy Swing was SRSG.  I found a Video Unit consisting of a P-3 Video Producer, 4 Internal f/s 4 Editors, two national staff cameramen, a sound engineer and a head writer. At first glance, this was an impressive line up, though the lack of balance between editors and cameraman was an obvious problem. The only international cameraman in the unit was  Carlo Ontal, a  P-3 Video Producer who had been acting as OIC . Mario immediately redeployed Carlo to Goma to set up a production office in the East on my arrival.  This was a very talented group, and I would like to extend my appreciation to my predecessors Yasmina Bouziane and Isabelle Abric for having assembled this team, which has remained intact until this year. In this respect, the Video Unit was a unique entity within the Division of Public Information, which was notorious for internal strife. Over the next 4 ½ years, I was periodically reminded that this notoriety was well deserved, and one of my main accomplishments was keeping the Video Unit insulated from  the various attempts to break us up and drag us into the fray. I am very proud to say that there was 100% solidarity within the Video Unit throughout my 4½ years. Cohesion of this kind with a minimum of friction made work a pleasure, and enabled us to focus on quality.

Equipment was impressive: I found an office equipped with the latest Final Cut Pro software, HD Sony cameras, and a Systems contract which enabled us to order compatible replacements without going through the time-consuming ordeal of Procurement. This Systems contract enabled us to have working equipment at all times in a country with no repair services.

 Our primary task was a weekly news program called LA SEMAINE EN BREF. MONUC paid Congolese TV stations around the country some $300,000 per annum to broadcast the c. 5  minute program for 30 minutes per week. Initially, broadcast was Analog, so sound and picture quality was poor, and there were no feedback mechanisms. Personally, I found LA SEMAINE EN BREF archaic in form, with a patronizing voice of God narration over images of VIP sound bites – traditionally safe UN fare  designed to flatter bosses and avoid  controversy. OK for World War II newsreel, but hardly 21^st Century. However,  I had just arrived, and Mario liked it, so it remained unchanged. 

Perhaps the major event during this period was the abrupt departure of Mr. Swing in early 2008, just before the signing of the historic Goma Peace Accords. The timing was peculiar, since Mr, Swing had been SRSG for 5 years, and the Goma Peace Accords were to be the climax of his life’s work as a diplomat in central Africa. It was no secret that the Congolese, including President Kabila, himself, adored Mr. Swing; they were startled when Mr. Swing left before his successor, Alan Doss, arrived , and there was no  handover ceremony. Mr. Doss’ first edict to us was a Soviet-style ban on all images of his predecessor. Mr. Doss also clearly had no use for Mario, and refused to meet with him until Mario’s departure, which made it impossible to create a PID strategy for the new mandate of 2008.

 Ironically, as a lame duck for 6 months, Mario did give us more latitude, and we used this interlude to make what I think were two of our best efforts – MONUC HUMAN RIGHTS, a 22 minute  documentary  in English on the work of the Human Rights Division, which was broadcast worldwide  by DPI for International Human Rights day in December. 2008.This documentary dealt with one of the key dilemmas of the MONUC Mission :how to protect Human Rights in a country where there were few.

 To counteract the periodic disinformation campaigns against the mission, and their often absurd allegations, we created a Comic Q&A show called LE PROFESSEUR REPOND! ,  featuring  a  zany Congolese professor created by the Congolese mime Mira Mihkenza, who was well known for his music video COCO SOUING, an affectionate send-up of Mr. Swing produced by Mr. Mihkenza himself.

One of my first goals had been to create a YouTube channel for MONUC, to help off set  some  of the negative portrayals of MONUC in that medium by groups like Staf Brenda Bili. The result

was www.YouTube.com/MONUCVIDEO, and www.Facebook.com/MONUCVIDEO, which exist to  this day, with most of our programs from 2008-2012., including LE PROFESSEUR REPOND!

During my first year, my main priority was getting to know the team, and to create a positive

working environment through established daily routines, clear directives and goals, as well as an open communications flow so everyone knew what was expected, and that I welcomed

feedback.  It has been my experience that good creative talent needs to be treated with respect.

August, 2008- September, 2008: We had heard that Kevin S. Kennedy would soon be Director, but that Jean Jacques Simon, Head of Radio Okapi, would be OIC until Mr. Kennedy was able to assume command . Little did we know that Mr. Simon and a P-3 Radio Producer  close to Mr. Doss were surreptitiously planning a massive reorganization of PID before Mr. Kennedy arrived. When the P-3 Radio Producer submitted a written plan for this re-organization to Mr. Doss, with the express goal of creating a new Rapid Response Unit,  this written plan was sent by COS to those affected by the plan, and the war was on. The Unit Chiefs insisted that the P-3 write a written retraction and send it to the SRSG. He refused, doubtless thinking he had the support of the SRSG, but the winds had already changed. The P-3 had forgotten that we were still under the direct supervision of DSRSG Mountain, whom he had neglected to copy in his evaluation. As a result, the carpet was pulled out from under him, and soon both he and Jean Jacques Simon found themselves the subject of CDU investigations. This imbroglio was both divisive and destructive, None of us knew what SRSG Doss had planned for us, but if this abortive putsch was any indication of his modus operandi, it was going to be a bumpy ride.

October, 2008-February, 2009: I knew Kevin Kennedy from New York, and was very happy about the prospects of working with him. He did not disappoint. Kevin proved to be a very demanding and hard working supervisor with an extensive knowledge of the UN system, as well as a sophisticated communications professional always ready to engage his colleagues on all levels to get their views.

For us in video, this was particularly important, since he was receptive to our ideas and our needs for his editorial input. This led to a fruitful creative atmosphere, and the most notable result was our weekly television magazine MONUC REALITES, which was a true 21st century communications vehicle for promoting the MONUC mandate inspired by CNN’s BACK TALK. I shall explore exactly why this program was so significant in a later section.  Suffice it to say  that  we had many indications the show was  popular among all levels of Congolese society, and we never had any complaints from any Congolese.

While Kevin made promotion of the MONUC mandate among the Congolese population our top priority, he also encouraged us to produce material for other audiences, most notably UN CHEMIN VERS LA PAIX SEME D’EMBUCHES, a 22 minute oral history of the ten years of the MONUC Mission that  showed how the mission had evolved over the years. He also supported distribution of MONUC HUMAN RIGHTS, which was shown around the world for International Human Rights Day in 2008, as well as DRC distribution of the first two episodes of LE PROFESSEUR REPOND!. Kevin had given himself two years to put MONUC PID in order, and he was making real progress when UN HR reform, forced him to return to his post iat UNHQ 6 months ahead of schedule. This was very unfortunate both for the Video Unit and PID as a whole, since we did not have a professionally competent Director PID after his departure in early 2010.

March, 2010:  There were many rumors regarding Kevin’s successor, but most of us were surprised to see the late Olamide Adedeji become Acting Director in early 2010. Former HO in Bunia, Ms. Adedeji was a charming and very literate woman who told us she had been asked by Mr. Doss to run PID until a new director could be found. She freely admitted she had no background in communications, and would be reliant upon us as communications professionals. As weeks became months, this proved to be a very  difficult arrangement as Ms. Adedeji in reality had the Spokesperson, Madnodgje Mounoubai  giving us orders. When he began to attack MONUC REALITES in meetings, I objected, pointing out he was the same rank as I was, and was certainly not my supervisor.

We did do a special for The 50 th Anniversary of DRC Independence titled L’ONU ET LA RDC – 50 ANS DE PARTENARIAT, intended to introduce MONUSCO and the Country Team to the Congolese, and produced versions in 5 local languages, True to her word, Olamide let us in Video carry on the work we had started with Kevin Kennedy, but the stress of the job combined with her own poor health proved catastrophic Olamide suddenly passed away in August of 2010, leaving behind an understandably traumatized but also a very divided PID.  I shall elaborate in a further section.

September, 2010- October, 2010: Deputy Director Madnodge Mounoubai, the Spokesperson, became OIC, and immediately asserted his authority, shouting down anyone who refused to toe the line in PID Meetings., such as when I  dared to ask if we might discuss PID strategy. Instead, he gave us a mysterious document written by an unknown Anglophone which presented a reactive, damage control approach completely at odds with the approach advocated by SRSG Roger Meece in his first meeting with us.  At that time, I seriously considered resigning. Life is too short to work with abusive idiots. However, a new director suddenly materialized.

 November, 2010 – 24 December, 2011 : When George Ola-Davies became Director PID in November of 2010, he met with Video Unit and made us many promises, saying, “ Give me 6 months!” and we gave him our full support. Unfortunately, by the time of his departure on Christmas Eve, 2011, he had broken most of them.

During his tenure, we had no communications strategy, no work plan, no editorial meetings, no internal communications, no transparency, and no respect for chain of command or previously established SOP. As journalist Fawaz Gerges said of Moammar Qaddaf:“ He destroyed all state institutions and replaced them with a cult of personality.” The same might be said of Mr. Ola-Davies, who signed his internal emails  “god” and who seemed to have such faith in his supreme judgement and ability that he never had to listen to mere mortal professionals like the rest of us.

 The ensuing chaos created a division run on his whim, and when he did not get his way, he turned mean and personal.  One of the casualties was our flagship MONUSCO REALITES, which died when Mr. Ola-Davies’ friends in Budget suddenly decided we could not hire freelance Congolese talent as reporters,. Over two years, we had done over 100 episodes, Now, suddenly without support for reporters, as well as without support for travel to cover MONUSCO activities on the frontlines, we were forced to create a new program on short notice. The result, ONU NEWS, was a glossy, Fox News- style program featuring our excellent cadre of presenters from Radio Okapi covering more or less the same VIP soundbites we had been covering with LA SEMAINE EN BREF.  In short, the same tired old steak with a new sauce.

The big event during this period was the disastrous Presidential election, described by a WASHINGTON POST editorial page as a “ political failure.’ PID’s contribution to these elections was to provide unconditional support to the CENI, a position I found both ethically dubious, and aesthetically appalling.Rather than trying to set a positive example with quality product, Video Unit was ordered to serve as a production entity for scripts written entirely by the CENI without any input by us- with predictably lamentable results. However, Mr. Ola-Davies reign was inexplicably cut short in the weeks after the elections, and he mysteriously vanished on 24 December, 2011.

24 December, 2011- 21 January,2012 : As senior professional at the time of Mr. Ola-Davies’ exit, I was appointed OIC by COS Ola Almgren . The post electoral period proved particularly sensitive, as many Congolese accused us of helping the government run what had been an obviously rigged election.The challenge was  to explain that, while  nearly all international observer agreed that the elections had not been credible our mandate explicitly limited our role to one of logistical support . The Congolese

Governement  did us no favors by suggesting  that MONUSCO had actively participated in every aspect of the elections, thereby giivng them some credibility. Under these conditions, I arranged for a Radio Okapi interview with DSRSG Leila Zerrougui to explain the MONUSCO Mandate as it pertained to the elections, and Madame Zerrougui was superb, clearly explaining what our job was, and what it was not. I then had the interview translated into all the national languages and distributed around the country by our Outreach Unit.  Madame Zerrougui was well aware that we did not want to be in the position of defending the elections themselves, thereby defending the indefensible., which would have made matters even worse,All we could do was hope that the moment would pass, and that public attention would return to the bulwark of our mandate, which was Protection of Civilians.  As my tenure as OIC /PID was coming to an end, we were expecting the arrival of yet another new Director PID.

21 January, 2012- Present:  Unfortunately, for reasons that were never made clear to, the new director never arrived, and we once again found ourselves  under the rule of OIC/Spokesperson Madnodge Mounoubai. Although I was de facto his deputy, and had been recommended for a 6 month extension by COS as “irreplaceable,” I was summarily cut out of the loop on all matters, including replacement of video personnel. Told to submit my own recommendations in my Mission End Report, I retired from MONUSCO without further ado on 30 June.

II ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

2.1. BACKGROUND

Here I would like to focus on some fundamental communications issues universal to all missions.

I have been working with film and video for the United Nations since 1976, though hardly exclusively.

During these years, I have noticed a fundamental dilemma afflicting most UN information efforts - namely, do UN Information agencies produce news or strategic communications?

This distinction is critical, since it affects the production process from  concept through to consumption.For reasons both personal and professional. many UN information officers prefer to think they are doing news rather than strategic  communications. This is a fundamental mistake. For both political and professional reasons, the UN cannot do news. News requires freedom from political control as well as a high speed production capacity the UN lacks.

Acceptance of  this reality need not be a handicap. Quite to the contrary. To begin with, the United Nations is a political organization with political goals. To help achieve these goals, the UN must develop communications strategies that help convince large segments of the population that these political goals are in their interest, and are therefore worth supporting.

In a DPKO Mission like MONUSCO, the administration must determine with Director PID what key messages should be conveyed, and Director PID should enlist the creative skills of the entire Division to determine how to most effectively convey these messages.

This is the way we worked when Kevin Kennedy was Director, P.I.D, and  his approach was very successful. He gave us the messages, and then challenged us to find the best ways to express it.As a result, we all became involved in the task of promoting the mission, and our attention was focused on finding creative solutions.

We were fortunate in that Kevin was supportive as well as demanding, and that we felt we could trust both his judgement and his professionalism. If there was a disagreement, as is bound to happen in creative discussion, there could be a heated exchange, but it never became personal.

As a result, we felt we could be honest with Kevin, and take risks, knowing whatever we said would go no further. A noted, we had felt great pressure from SRSG Doss prior to Kevin’s arrival..

 And we knew that Mr. Doss took great interest in our work. However, thanks to Kevin, we never had any problems with Mr. Doss after his arrival, and I am eternally grateful to him for that. Other MONUSCO colleagues were far less fortunate when Mr. Doss was in charge.

 2.2: GOOD PRACTISES

Here I would like to single out the Video Unit team for the support they provided during my tenure.  They were all highly skilled video professionals from a variety of countries, and most of them were MONUC veterans who taught me a lot about MONUC and the DRC .I was very lucky to be able to work with them. and I am happy to say I think the feeling was mutual.

Dedicated professionals are the backbone of any UN Peacekeeping mission, and all of those responsible for the creation of this group deserve praise.  The only missing link when I arrived was organization and managerial vision, and, as an experienced film and television director and producer, I was able to provide both. It was a remarkably good fit.  I knew no one in P.I.D. prior to arrival, and went through the  standard recruitment process; special mention should be given to Hamanyoun Mubtakir, who was in charge of MONUC recruitment at that time. When I was interviewed for the job, I was very much the outside candidate. I managed to get the job anyway, through a unanimous panel decision. In this case, the system worked.

Another successful HR effort was the MDP, or the Management Development Program. I attended several training programs in the course of my 4 ½ years with the mission, and the MDP was by far the best. The trainers were external professionals, and they were true experts on managerial styles and techniques.

Among other things, they emphasized the 360 evaluation to give supervisors feedback from their staff. I was used to this approach from my work as a professor in New York, and I found it both educational and at times humbling.  Over the course of my 9 years, I was fortunate to have good rapport with most of my students.  Colleagues who received poor evaluations soon lost their jobs. In my view, 360 evaluations are an essential tool for any supervisor who wishes to improve his or her managerial skills.

Unfortunately, the United Nations system is currently behind the times in this area. At present, a supervisor need only please his or her supervisor to succeed, and treat his or her staff as they like. This does not encourage good management practices.

2.3: CHALLENGES AND LESSONS

The primary challenge of any Public Information Division is to create support for the Mission Mandate among both the population being served and the external world. The primary challenge for the Video Unit in this context should be to produce quality Video Product which helps achieve these goals. These were our goals when Mario Zamorano and Kevin Kennedy were our directors.

However, after the departure of Kevin Kennedy, our primary challenge became to produce quality video product in spite of incompetent and even sometimes destructive supervision – supervision which had no interest in hearing our professional opinions on any matter, creative or professional.

Under these conditions, protecting the integrity ot the Video Unit became my top priority.

 During this period, I used every means available to avoid personal confrontations, even under extreme provocation.  Over the years, I have learned that such confrontations seldom produce desired outcomes, and often makes things worse.

Aside from a few decades of professional production experience around the world, what enabled me to survive in MONUC was my training as a yudansha in aikido, also known the art of peace, which I have been practicing for 20 years now. In Kinshasa, I helped the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Embassy, Fujita-San, to create a dojo with Congolese students, and this free time activity helped me understand the Congolese people better than any official UN program. Furthermore, I am not aware of any UN training program which helps staff deal with some of the  complex internal politics of the organization, which can be a serious distraction. Therefore, I would encourage anyone of any age seriously interested in becoming a real peacekeeper to explore aikido. Peace begins in our own hearts and minds, and is reflected in the way we treat others. If we peacekeepers cannot work together, we can hardly expect the populations we serve to do so.

When I felt the climate in the division was becoming truly unbearable, I also turned to the Ombudsman for advice and support. For most of my tenure, the Ombudsman was Gang Li, and he taught me a great deal about the UN system while advising me on how to best defuse combustible situations. I felt I could be perfectly frank with him: it was like having the luxury of a good lawyer for guidance and counsel. My previous mission, UNTAET, had no Ombudsman, and the difference was remarkable. I feel the office of the Ombudsman is an invaluable addition to Peacekeeping Missions, with the caveat that the Ombudsman must be completely independent from the mission, and that all communication with the Ombudsman must be kept confidential.

Other major challenges involved our dependence on other divisions.

For example, on a technical level, Video Unit had a challenging relationship with CITS.  We were completely dependent upon CITS for all internet services, and, despite the efforts of every PID Director, we rarely ever received the support we needed to do our jobs properly.

The sole exception was UNIFEED, Thanks to the program File Catalyst, combined with the hard work and dedication of our Video IT experts Titus Nyukuri and Kevin Jordan, we were usually able to send short video clips to UNIFEED, the UN website on a regular basis,

FTP has been the industry standard for electronic transmission of video material for several years now, but we were never able to get it functional in MONUC or MONUSCO, in spite of many a conference and many an unkept promise. We recommended a privately paid, dedicated line for FTP transmission from Goma to Kinshasa on several occasions, only to be told it was againstUN rules. Frankly, had we adhered to all UN rules, we never would have been able to do anything.

 As a result, we were forced to send tapes by hand from Goma to Kinshasa several times a week, putting us in violation of MOVCON rules. I authorized this practice – with the tacit understanding of the Chief of Transport, once he understood our predicament.

Likewise, the CITS ban on YouTube made it impossible for UN staff to see our weekly programs on our YouTube channel. As a result, we had to send our programs by Intranet to our colleagues, and there were always problems. Many in the sectors could not open the files, so naturally they directed their complaints to me, and I, in turn, attempted to direct them to the CITS Helpdesk. I felt it was important that our colleagues had some contact with what was going on in the rest of the mission, so this was definitely a worthwhile effort.

Our YouTube and Facebook channels remained essential to the effort to get our message out to the external world, and we turned to CITS for assistance to make it possible to upload our programs from our offices. However, we never could find a time-efficient way to upload programs on our UN computers, so we did all of the uploading at home on our private servers, at our own expense. It was worth every penny.

However, a  dedicated line for some $300. a month with a private server was a option that would have solved both the FTP problem and the uploading of material, but that was one that was never approved, due to so-called “ UN rules” that I never really saw or understood.

Indeed, this solution would have been far more cost effective than the expensive BGAN option proposed by CITS, which would have cost at least $3000 or more per week, depending upon the number of transmissions. Just for the record, BGAN is based on sat phones, and only makes sense in a remote location when no other options are available and time is of the essence.

The final challenge I will deal with here was the baffling decision by Finance in 2011 to make it impossible for to hire freelance Congolese presenters, even though we had plenty of money in our budget to pay freelance Congolese talent, and we had been doing so for three years without any problems at all. Budget failed to understand that articulate, attractive and hard working presenters do not grow on trees, and we had searched for a long time before finding our star Horeb Bulambo, who became the Congolese face and voice of the mission for many Congolese. And since he was educated, attractive and charismatic, he did an excellent job as our front man promoting the MONUSCO mandate from remote locations around the country. Anyone with any knowledge of television will understand when I was say that he had been very hard to find. Yet our friends from Budget, doubtless with some encouragement from some of our PID colleagues who were jealous of our success, turned a deaf ear to our pleas, effectively killing the program  at a critical time just before the elections.

This was particularly aggravating to me because I had just been in meetings in New York with Caroline Petit and Stephane Dujarric of DPI, who liked MONUSCO REALITES, and were trying to set up a free distribution deal for the program with Belgian RTBF, which wanted to broadcast the program for free in Europe, thereby reaching the Congolese diaspora and others .  Astonishingly enough, then PID Director George Ola-Davies gave us no support either with Budget or RTBF, and a very promising opportunity withered on the vine, along with MONUSCO REALITES.

No explanations were offered. In the world of communications, such professional negligence is a serious matter, and would be grounds for dismissal in any professional organization I am familiar with.  Backdoor communications with the Administration had never been my style – nor did COS or the SRSG ,much to their credit , encourage them - so there was little I could do at the time.

A related challenge was our relationship with Radio Okapi. As far as I am concerned, Radio Okapi is the jewel in the crown of MONUC PID, and is the greatest accomplishment I know of in any DPKO Information operation. Radio Okapi is a real radio station that has become the most popular and trusted voice on the DRC airwaves, thanks to a joint effort by MONUC and the Swiss Fondation Hirondelle. The relationship between PID and Hirondelle has been stormy, however. Hirondelle representatives often feel that PID was in the propaganda business, while Okapi should be doing objective news. By the time I arrived in 2007, there was clearly a lot of bad blood in the air, and to this day there are many at Radio Okapi who still do not understand they work for the UN.

Thanks to Radio Okapi chief Jean Jacques Simon (who was professional enough to work with me  in spite of past differences,) I was able to obtain the services of two Okapi presenters who wanted to expand into television presenting. We began to use them for MONUC REALITES, and they  gave our program an intimacy and warmth that had been missing. When it came to paying them, however, I was told UN rules prohibited them getting any compensation. Since I needed the presenters to know their lines and be punctual, I made a private arrangement with the presenters, and my solution worked perfectly.  The  female presenters were excellent and we made them look even more beautiful.

Soon, other reporters from Okapi wanted to work with us . I was very interested, since I had been seeking an alternative to Horeb for some time. The Okapi reporters were educated professionals who could travel and work in the field, unlike anyone else available. Some collaboration seemed natural, since it would have promoted Okapi capacity building for the future, and would have eliminated our  dependence on freelancers.  What I had in mind was having some reporters for a week or two every month.

However, when I proposed the possibility of some collaboration with Okapi to then Director George Ola-Davies, his response was to try to create a conflict between myself  and Radio Okapi Chef d’Antenne, Amadou Ba. Fortunately, both Amadou and I could see what he was trying to do; and neither of us had any reason for dispute, so we dodged the bullet. However, that meant curtains for what should have been an obvious option of maximizing talent at hand for the benefit of all, especially our Congolese partners.

Episodes such as this, along with others, made me wonder what on earth was going on in PID. In the case of George Ola-Davies, it seemed that at times we were not working for the same organization. More on this in Part IV.

2.4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MONUSCO VIDEO UNIT:

These items are based on written recommendations developed with my MDP coach after the MDP IN 2011. I submitted most of them to former Director PID George Ola-Davies, and they were all ignored. However, I am convinced that they all remain viable and relevant.

• KENNEDY SOP FOR VIDEO UNIT REGION EAST SHOULD BE RE-INSTITUTED
• DIRECTOR PID SHOULD HAVE MONTHLY EDITORIAL MEETINGS WITH CHIEF, VIDEO
• SHARING OF REPORTERS WITH RADIO OKAPI SHOULD BE ENABLED
• FUNDS FOR A DEDICATED LINE FOR FTP SHOULD BE RELEASED BY PID
• VIDEO CHIEF SHOULD BE IN LOOP FOR ALL VIDEO RECRUITMENT

2.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DPKO/DFS AND OTHER MISSIONS:

THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE :

While most pundits and media experts recognize we live in a Digital Age, and are in the midst of a Digital Revolution which is changing our lives in more ways than we can be aware of, the United Nations remains mired in the Age of Print, almost a century behind the modern world.

Since the UN is, as noted elsewhere, a political organization, this emphasis on print and words is understandable. After all, nations have gone to war over differing interpretations of words in treaties. However, this focus on words makes the UN often blind to the power of images, and keeps the UN way behind the curve when it comes to contemporary multimedia communications. In DPKO missions I am familiar with , the Spokesperson sometimes doubles as Director. P.I.D. and this  has resulted in a PID stunted by a regressive emphasis on what I call the UN damage-control school of Public Information. The main tenet of the damage-control school is that all criticisms , no matter how inane, must be rebutted,; corollary #2 is that  the worst thing one can do is to make a mistake, and that, therefore, all texts need to be thoroughly vetted and revised, as  often as needed.

In terms of video, this means the safest way to deal with any subject is to: a) Have a thoroughly vetted narration; or b): to show a VIP soundbite, since the VIP can then take the blame if something goes wrong – and he or she will be happy to be seen on camera, which is money in the bank for the Director, P.I.D.

However, regardless of political leanings, successful professional practitioners of propaganda and mass marketing from Josef Goebbels to Gene Lakoff are in complete agreement that images are far more powerful than words, and the billions upon billions of dollars spent on corporate branding  and political campaigns are tangible proof: a picture is worth a thousand words, and that therefore images, not words, are the way to people’s hearts, and that, above all, one should never be boring.

In direct contrast, the deadly secret of the UN damage -control school of Public Information is that being boring is not necessarily such a bad thing, just so long as the boss is happy. Indeed, if the program is boring, fewer people will watch it and there is less of a chance something can go wrong.  And, as I experienced first hand working with SG Kurt Waldheim, who is going to tell the  boss he is boring? \

People who understand communications are first and foremost good listeners and good managers, ready to understand their intended audience and to seek ways to touch their hearts.

Directors of P.I.D, first and foremost, need to be acquainted with modern communications theory.

It also helps if they have some knowledge of media production management, as well as experience in managing the creative talent actually doing the work on the ground.

 Since good spokespersons are primarily performers who can deftly articulate the party Line, they are rarely also good listeners or innovative managers. Accordingly, the Spokesperson and the Director PID should be different people, if at all possible, since there are very few individuals possessing both the ability to be a good performer and a good listener.

PART III: PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

Personally, as a film and video producer with several decades of international experience both inside and outside the United Nations system, I found my experience as Chief, Video Unit to be both rewarding and fulfilling. To be sure, there were challenges, but this is normal in every professional situation. What was most meaningful to me was that I was given the opportunity to do some quality work – work that I am proud of, and that should be useful to my colleagues in future peacekeeping missions.

In this regard, the genesis of our signature program, MONUC REALITES, is a good example. When we created MONUC REALITES in 2008, we were under intense indirect pressure from Kevin Kennedy to create something modern and up-to-date that would promote the mission mandate to the Congolese population. We knew that we had to produce something radically different from LA SEMAINE EN BREF, but we had to navigate our way through a series of false starts before we got it right.

For example, SRSG Doss was in love with speed, and wanted everything to be as real-time as possible.

He was oblivious to the fact that we were in a country where everything ran late, and where the technical infrastructure was a few decades behind the Western world. For example, shortly after he arrived, he demanded a live telecast of his first Town Hall meeting broadcast to all the sectors – an order so far-fetched that we could only shake our heads in amazement. Eventually, CITS , afraid to tell him that what he was asking was completely impossible, foolishly tried to compromise with a live audio transmission to the sectors that was a complete disaster . The feedback from the speakers was so loud that every word was unintelligible across the country, the sole exception being our Video audio feed coming from our

ace sound engineer Georges Dominique’s lapel microphone.

So, when it came to our new program, SRSG Doss initially wanted a daily video response to some item in the DRC news that had irked him, and, incredibly enough, he wanted that response embedded in the local DRC news shows. This proved to be a non-starter when the Congolese TV stations simply refused to allow it. This was a blessing, because we longed to do a real program, rather knee-jerk reactions. It was also my feeling that many of the wild accusations about us in the DRC media were best ignored, and the dignifying them with a response would give them more credibility than they deserved

Both my senior video producer Carlo Ontal and I agreed that a pro-active approach showing Congolese inter-acting with MONUC staff in the field would be far more interesting television, and far more effective.

Fortunately, Kevin Kennedy had the same mind-set, though he also wanted a news segment with up-to-date MONUC news from the weekly press conference and other sources.

After several demos, we managed to create a video magazine format that combined both a news segment and a feature story – with the news story the lead, but a vignette intro at the top as a tease for the feature story. The thinking behind this was simple. We expected the audience to be intrigued by the feature story, but we also wanted them to watch the news items, so they had to see the news before they could see the feature story.

I first learned this trick years ago when I was in India studying the Indian film industry. The Films Divison of the Indian government was the world’s largest producer of informational films at the time, and they forced all commercial movie theatres to show  (and pay for!) their films as shorts prior to the main feature.

The Indian Institute of Mass Communications did studies on the Films Division products, and, much to their dismay, they found that it was difficult indeed to get people to watch the films unless they were sandwiched between popular commercial features.

We then had to find a way to generate feature stories on a regular basis so we would never run dry.

The newly created Video Unit Region East ,led by producer Carlo Ontal, and editor Titus Nyukuri, was given the task of shooting feature stories around the East, while Kinshasa-based director Alan Brain would shoot material around the West. Every month, Carlo would come up with story ideas that we would fine  tune in conference calls with Kevin Kennedy, and then he would go on the road with Titus and our reporter Horeb Bulambo and shoot 3 or 4 stories per trip. Titus would do a rough cut in the field, and then send the stories to Kinshasa by hand, as described previously.

Meanwhile, our national staff cameraman Serge Kasanga and Daniel Wangisha would cover news stories in the field and in Goma and Kinshasa as needed. Back in Kinshasa, every Monday, head writer Ado Abdou would finish a script and send it to me. I would do a rewrite, and send to the Director for approval, and then send it to the Presenter on Tuesday night. We would then shoot the presentation on Wednesday, and editors Meriton Ahmeti and Kevin Jordan would finish the program on Thursday afternoon so I could then submit it for final approval by the Director, so we could distribute to the TV stations by the weekend.

With this workflow, we were able to produce over 120 programs between 2008- 2010, barely ever missing a week, and maintaining a consistency of quality. In this regard, special credit must go to our brilliant graphic designer Meriton Ahmeti, who gave the show a production value that was unlike anything the Congolese had ever seen, and therefore aroused great visual interest.  The Congolese TV stations paid us the supreme compliment of showing the program in prime time without charging an extra fee, and we received direct accolades from both Information Minister Lambert Mende and First Lady Olive Lembe Kabila, and we never had a complaint of any kind from our target audience, the Congolese .

Our only detractors consisted of the Spokesperson and his cronies, for reasons known only to them.

As far as I am concerned, MONUC REALITES was a mission well accomplished, and I am very proud to have been part of this team effort. It is my sincere hope that this program serves as a point of departure for future video programs by other DPKO missions.  For the immediate future, I shall be writing a doctoral thesis on digital documentary for Sweden’s University of Lund, and my old school, Fashion Institute of Technology in New York, has offered a position in 2013 in their newly created Film Department as a Professor of Documentary Film.

I feel indeed fortunate to have been given the opportunity to work on Peacekeeping missions, and I am open to the possibility of a consultancy in the future., though preferably not with MONUSCO, for  reasons which will become evident in Part IV,  Come what may, I shall always be more than happy to share my experiences and whatever I have learned with DPKO colleagues in the future.  For me, this has been both an honor and a privilege.

I

PART IV: CONFIDENTIAL OBSERVATIONS: A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION AND IMPUNITY:

After a lifetime working in film and television production around the world, I am hardly naïve, and I certainly am aware that the UN is susceptible to all the same ills as any other institution. However, since the fundamental power of the UN lies in its moral authority, UN staff must be held to a higher moral standard than members of other organizations. Sadly, in MONUSCO, a culture of impunity and corruption has evolved, and this culture has become entrenched in the Division of Public Information since 2011.  Corruption is a frequent byproduct of an activity; however, in countries like Brazil, I have seen corruption become the main priority, with the “official” project becoming a secondary concern. Such is frequently the case in the DRC, and it now, unfortunately, has become the case in MONUSCO. Human Resources, particularly Recruitment, are complicit in this culture. Cronies hire other cronies, regardless of qualifications, while all those who present resistance to this culture are forced out.  I have tried to deal with this matter politely and diplomatically, but quiet diplomacy has failed miserably.  As previously noted, I reject the backdoor approach to authority. so here I shall spell things out, using a few firsthand  examples:

Case#!: In  early 2011, when I was seeking a TVA to replace our P-3 Video Producer Carlo Ontal, who had told me he was “burned our” and had just received approval from New York for one year of unpaid home leave to ungrade his technical skills, I found myself under intense pressure from then Director PID George Ola-Davies and Spokesperson Madnodge Mounoubai to hire a completely unqualified G-6 National Staff from ONUCI. When I pointed out that this individual was not remotely qualified, and that we had 4 other eminently qualified candidates, the Spokesperson said,” Give the guy a break.”

Giving people breaks was not part of my job description; earlier, I had gone to Recruitment to learn why this apparently unqualified G-6 had been short-listed, only to discover that the Recruitment Officer, Norbert Beugre, knew him, and thought that he was” an excellent cameraman”. This struck me as serious conflict of interest; when I then asked about the candidate’s exotic degree in something called “ L’Art du Spectacle” from “ L’Ecole de Beaux Arts” at the Hamburg School of Economic and Politics, Mr. Beugre sniffed that I perhaps did not understand the German academic system.

That was a serious mistake; with two graduate degrees from Swedish academic institutions and 9 years as an adjunct professor in New York, I knew very well that the Hamburg School of Economics and Politics could never have a Faculty of Fine Arts. An e-mail form Hamburg confirmed this fact, Then Ombudsman Gang Li suggested I write a confidential memo to Mr. Ola-Davies saying I did not wish to be party to a conspiracy to commit fraud, and urging him to select one of the four candidates I had recommended so we could replace Carlo before the 2011 DRC elections.  Mr. Ola-Davies never responded.

As a result, I asked Carlo to postpone his leave until after the elections. He graciously agreed, only to then find himself the subject of a vicious campaign of lies, smears and obstructionist tactics that made it virtually impossible for him to do anything we proposed – so he could later be accused of being “unproductive.” by both Mr. Ola-Davies and Mr. Mounoubai. As Josef  Goebbels famously said, “ Repeat a lie often enough, and people will believe it!”

 Mr. Ola-Davies’ interest is the G-6 remains murky; when later asked, he insisted to me he was not close to the G-6 , although it was clear he was in constant contact with his person. However, a very reliable source who  knows both of them told me that the G-6 was a girl friend’s brother, and that seems plausible enough to me.

Carlo is now scheduled to begin his one year of unpaid home leave on 1 August, 2012, and there has not been any word on his replacement.  Much to my dismay, Mr. Mounoubai has not lost interest in the G-6, either and has advised those whom I recommended that the TVA is no longer open and to get tested for the roster. The G-6  comes from a very wealthy family, which may be relevant. The UN is a small world indeed.

Case#2: This are not the only currently open post in the Video Unit. In January, 2012,when I was OIC/PID, I discovered that Meriton Ahmeti, our graphics designer and best editor, was going to resign in April to return to his family. I contacted Recruitment, and Mr. Norbert Beugre gave me a list of rostered candidates for F/S 4 Video Editor. There were two outstanding candidates – both American women working as supervising editors for big name companies in American cities.

Since neither had worked for the UN – or any other international organization – I wondered why on earth either one would want to come to work with MONUSCO.

I then looked at the other candidates on the roster, and noticed that they were all “Information Officers” from other African countries without any experience either as an editor or  in video production. I contacted the American women and learned they were indeed not interested, just as I had suspected. Mr. Beugre then told me that we could advertise the post, but then it might take 6 months or so to find new candidates. I began to feel manipulated, and wondered where all the Video Editors were from other DPKO missions. I knew three of our editors – Meriton Ahmeti, Alan Brain and Titus Nyukuri – wanted to get on the roster but could not figure out how to get tested. By then Mr. Mounoubai had returned from leave, and had ordered Recruitment not to talk with me at all. I expressed my concerns for the future of the Video Unit, to COS, asking for a meeting with Mr. Mounoubai to go over future configuration of the Video Unit, but Mr. Mounoubai refused.

Case #3: Another major incident of corruption in PID that I witnessed first hand involved financial improprieties during the 2011 Elections. Again, I do not consider myself a naïve person, but this incident was both so flagrant and shameless that I still find it disturbing today.

What with my staff’s experience covering the 2006 Elections, we had been expecting a heavy workload for UNIFEED, but we also wanted to produce some music videos promoting suitable messages. We estimated each video would cost around $5,000 for talent.  However, Mr. Ola-Davies vetoed our videos, telling us we were instead to function as a production arm for the DRC Election Organization CENI, and produce a series of videos they had scripted. I was appalled, both for ethical and qualitative reasons. First, CENI was thought by most Congolese to be pro-Kabila, and I had thought we were to be neutral. Second, as an award-winning screenwriter, I was sure we could produce far better material than any sketches written by anyone working for the CENI.

 Much to my surprise, my reservations were completely ignored.

But how was I know that the CENI scripts were written by the Spokesperson’s girl friend, whom he was planning to give a job in his own Media Relations office before we had even finished editing the sketches she had written? In short, we had been shamelessly used for his own personal agenda – just as Mr. Ola-Davies had attempted to do.

The problem here also involved a potentially serious breach of Security. What with the controversy surrounding the Elections, how could we have someone from the CENI working in the Spokesperson’s

Office? What if, for example, the Administration decided to criticize the CENI?

By the time we had finished producing the 5 language versions of the interminably long sketches, we also learned that Mr. Ola-Davies had produced his own music video without our involvement.  When we saw how bad it was, we were thankful. Later, however, we became outraged when we learned he had somehow spent $82,000 making it – and then another $120,000 distributing it.With  great difficulty, I obtained copies of the MOD for c. $300,000 for this item and other Video items for the PID Elections Budget , signed by Mr. Mounoubai ,and  approved by his same friends in Budget who refused to allow us to pay our Congolese Presenter for MONUSCO REALITES.

To put these numbers in context, $300,000 was what we normally spent for video distribution of 60 minutes per week for an entire year nationwide. I also know the $82,000 music video was pulled from distribution at the last minute because someone noticed there was a picture of President Kabila on the wall that had been overlooked. So, once again, Video Unit had been used, and I can only assume that some people made some serious money on these productions, like their friends in the CENI.. Once I obtained hard copies of the budget, I brought the budget and the video to OIOS, along with a copy of a music video we had made for $5,000 fpr reference - only to be informed they had been planning an investigation when the new director arrived. By then, I knew that the new director was not coming, so that investigation was put on hold.

Case #4: Finally, we have never had an explanation regarding what happened to the new Director PID scheduled to arrive in early 2012.  Mr. Mounoubai told us to prepare for her arrival in a matter of weeks, and we all planned accordingly. We even knew who she was, but we were never told if she herself decided not to come for some reason, or if she was somehow found lacking a necessary credential. Mr. Mounoubai has a nasty habit of making the professional personal, and of making personal attacks on anyone who dares to ask uncomfortable questions – as he has famously done to several important Congolese politicians during the weekly press conference. Getting a straight answer out of him on this, or just about any other matter of importance, is impossible.

However, since I knew Ms. Jeanmonod was on the roster, and had been working for the UN in Kabul, I can only believe that she decided to turn down the job for personal reasons. She has every right to do so. in the absence of any official explanation, I can only speculate that it is entirely possible that , like some other prospective directors PID, discovered what a viper’s nest the Division currently is, and decided it was a situation best avoided.

Regardless, what is inexcusable is the fact that HR did not have alternative candidates. Whenever I seek to fill any post, I want as many options as possible, just in case Murphy’s Law rears its ugly head. Now, instead, Mr. Mounoubai has become de facto Director PID, and has managed to eliminate all potential opponents such as myself with the full cooperation of HR.

CONCLUSION:

Unfortunately, the culture corruption in PID  extends to Goma PIO as well as Kinshasa, and is not isolated to PID,, but pervasive. There is very strong evidence that an informal network extends to Security, CDU and even to the DMS office.  This means that a remedy limited to one division will not solve the problem.  At present, this means that serious misconduct and corruption go unpunished, provided the guilty parties have friends in the right places.

 For example, If, OIC/PID has a bad traffic accident, injuring a number of Congolese, and does not report the incident for several days, the incident might be buried, even if it has been the subject of a BOI.  Or if a female staff member came to Security saying her  life has been threatened by a Congolese female friend of OIC/PID, the investigation will be shelved.

 It also might mean that if the chauffeur of PIO Goma came to me with a lurid tale of smuggling of conflict minerals and other serious misconduct by his boss, there would be no place to send him to tell his story safely, without fear of reprisals, or worse. A few of us raised these issues with Mary Beth Buchanan of the Ethics Office when she was in Kinshasa, and she seemed shocked.

I have also passed on as much information as possible to OIOS, along with related documents, but they have a limited capacity without reliance upon Security for investigation.

Clearly, these are serious problems for MONUSCO and the UN requiring immediate attention.

Were I in charge, I would recommend moving both OIC/PID and his Deputy Spokesperson elsewhere as soon as possible, along with PIO Goma and the Chief of Security.

This was done in the past with the shake-up of the Radio Okapi hierarchy a few years ago.

It needs to be done now. Otherwise, any new director will find it a hopeless assignment.

Best,

Theodore Folke

Chief, MONUSCO Video Unit ( ret’d)

tedfolke@gmail.com

+66879933536

APPENDIX D: INTERVIEWS WITH MONUSCO VIDEO UNIT

DIGITAL DOCUMENTARY INTERVIEW FOR TED FOLKE’S THESIS

Note: The following questions are intended to create a profile of digital  technology used  by video professionals .The answers will be strictly

confidential, and will only be used for the writing of this thesis. Please contact me directly at tedfolke@gmail.com should you have any questions, Thank you!

1) Please briefly describe your production background and experience.

For the last 12 years i have been working as as  Video Editor, script writer, director, assistant director, post producer, production supervisor.  Private sector-advertising companies  and institutions like the UN were and are the  environment where i did and do  most of my work.

 

2) What is your current position, and how would you define your current production mission?

I am now production supervisor in well-established advertising company in Kosovo where i supervise the visual production from a idea generating phase up to the finalizing and distributing the product.

 

3). How do you employ digital technology in production?

80% of the production that i supervise is based on the digital technology, 20% is human driven production starting from the storyboard up to distribution.

 

4). How do you edit your digital material?

Mainly I use Final Cut Pro as the editing software since that enables me to work with the native files without loosing the quality.

 

5). How do you distribute it? Broadcast ? DVD?? Other?

Since now we are working strictly with HD format but the broadcasters still use the SD, I export my timeline as TGA sequence. This data is burned to DVD as a zipped file. When i do international distribution i use also dropbox.

 

6). What bandwidths do you have access to?

Broadband unlimited

 

  7) Do you use internet  distribution systems? If so, which ones?

Dropbox

 

  

8).Do you feel digital technology has made your material more available

    to the populations you are serving? If so, how?

By fast access to the product by the client, I get a faster feedback therefore finalizing it is much faster and the product-message is aired instantly.

 

9). What is the attitude of your superiors towards digital technology?

      Do they understand how it is changing the global media landscape?

      l

Sometimes there is a bit of nostalgic wave in all of us to work with more manual tools and not to rely on digital technology so much but by the end of the day we all end up with the smartphone, emails and videos as our main source of information. The attitude is that if you want to be part of and have an access to the global media world, you need to have a password and small digital hardworking creatures generate that password.

 

1o). How do you finance your productions? Are you employing the internet?

Our contact with the potential client is through the internet. We present ourselves and sell ourselves through the internet.

 

11). Finally, what are your own views on the future of digital documentary?

     

It has been said that if you leave the camera on for a while the subject that is being filmed will deliver a good performance because there is the feeling that the subject needs to fulfill the requirements of that pointy funny looking object-camera. Maybe that was the case while the film was rolling and made that specific hypnotizing sound. Nowadays in the digital era there is no more camera and the subject. Subject owns the camera and also owns the projection. Only something foreign and strange can be interesting. Today with youtube nothing is interesting therefore there cant be any digital documentary, only perversion and exploitation.

 

NB: As stated previously, all answers will be strictly confidential!

      

Yes

 

Appendix D: Interviews with Members of the Video Unit

DIGITAL DOCUMENTARY INTERVIEW FOR TED FOLKE’S THESIS

Note: The following questions are intended to create a profile of digital  technology used  by video professionals .The answers will be strictly

confidential, and will only be used for the writing of this thesis. Please contact me directly at tedfolke@gmail.com should you have any questions, Thank you!

1) Please briefly describe your production background and experience.

I have been producing video documentary since 1986 in the national TV station of Niger Republic, called Télé Sahel ORTN. I had high schools training in TV production, Communications and many other short time trainings in video producing.

 

2) What is your current position, and how would you define your current production mission?

Actually, I am Video producer in MONUSCO Public Information Division, in the DRC. My task is to help the UN Mission in the country to be better known by the local population, to know better its mandate and promote that mandate. It is obvious that sometimes many people don’t know exactly what the MONUSCO staffs are doing in the country and why after many years in the country, peace is not yet a reality.

 

3). How do you employ digital technology in production?

We are, in Video Unit, producing magazines to be aired by the local TV stations. In that purpose, we are using digital technologies during the production and the postproduction phases. Also for distribution, we are using the digital technology.

 

4). How do you edit your digital material?

We have, among staffs in Video Unit, some Video editors. They use the digital technology to edit stories, to make the graphics and to print DVD for distribution.

 

5). How do you distribute it? Broadcast ? DVD?? Other?

Once the story is edited and accepted, it is printed in DVD and distributed to local TV stations to be aired in the country. The distribution is also made via new technology such as YouTube, Facebook and also via the MONUSCO intranet web site.

 

6). What bandwidths do you have access to?

 

  7) Do you use internet  distribution systems? If so, which ones?

YouTube, Facebook, MONUSCO web site intranet.

 

  

8).Do you feel digital technology has made your material more available

    to the populations you are serving? If so, how?

Thanks to the digital technology, we can easily work and have a more reliable and with the best quality.

 

9). What is the attitude of your superiors towards digital technology?

      Do they understand how it is changing the global media landscape?

      l

The supervisors rely on the digital technology and encourage us to use it. They understood that it is the best way to communicate with the target and to be better understood by that target.

 

1o). How do you finance your productions? Are you employing the internet?

The productions are financed by the MONUSCO budget. All the equipment is paid by the Mission. The staffs are paid by the mission. We have an agreement with the TV stations to broadcast them. They are paid at the end of every month, via an MOP raised every year.

 

11). Finally, what are your own views on the future of digital documentary?

     

For now, digital technology has a good future. There is no other option for the moment.

 

DIGITAL DOCUMENTARY INTERVIEW FOR TED FOLKE’S THESIS

Note: The following questions are intended to create a profile of digital technology used  by video professionals .The answers will be strictly

Confidential, and will only be used for the writing of this thesis. Please contact me directly at tedfolke@gmail.com should you have any questions, Thank you!

1) Please briefly describe your production background and experience. 

I have more than 15 years of experience in television and film production. I started as an editor and develop into a cameramen and director. My main background is in TV journalism and from that I made the leap to documentaries.

2) What is your current position, and how would you define your current production mission?

Currently, I’m a video editor and documentary filmmaker in the video unit of MONUSCO, United Nations Mission for DRC. My current mission is to produce short length documentaries to better deliver the message of UN to the Congolese population.

3). How do you employ digital technology in production?

Nowadays, my whole production chain is digital. I film, depending on the situation, with a Panasonic AF100, a Canon 5d or a Sony FS100 going into a Ninja Digital Video Recorder through a HDMI cable. I record in Pro Res 1080p. Then, we download the images from the HDD of the Ninja to our Lacie HDDs and import the video files to Adobe Premiere. 

The video editing is done in Premiere, the video postproduction is done in Adobe After Effect, the colorization is done also in Premiere and the audio editing and mixing in Logic. Once the video and audio files are in the MAC, they never leave the MAC until the product is finish. 

We do the whole process in a Intel Power Mac but we could do it also in a Mac Mini.

4). How do you edit your digital material? 

I edit in Adobe Premiere. My editing process has not changed much over the years. Basically, I start watching all the material even If I film it. From that first session I take out the unusable material. Then, it comes a second session where I start to put some order on the timeline and also throw away more material. 

Then, I start putting together small blocks, small unit of sense and go over them again, again and again until they somehow work. From that point until the end of the project, the process will shape itself depending on what kind of project I’m editing. 

Now, we can film much more than before due to the cheap price of HDDs or fast memory cards compared to film. So, I really need to clean out the garbage at the beginning to be able to make good “music” later.

5). How do you distribute it? Broadcast ? DVD?? Other?

I’m trying to distance myself from DVD. I try to distribute videos as a file in a friendly codec so anybody can play the file in a media player or in a computer. DVD codec compared to a HD 1080 good file looks very bad and takes too much HDD space. HD looks better and takes less space than DVD.

6). What bandwidths do you have access to?

In Peru, my home country, I have 2mb x second speed for downloads, not the best but is better than what I have in DRC. In DRC, I have 150 kb x second for downloads. 

7) Do you use internet distribution systems? If so, which ones?

Depending on the tech level of the client, I can upload the video to YouTube in HD (1080p) or to Vimeo (also 1080P) or upload a file to Dropbox or even create a folder in my computer that he can access with a password and download with FTP software. 

8).Do you feel digital technology has made your material more available

    to the populations you are serving? If so, how? 

Well, here in Congo we are basically serving the Congolese. Taking into account that DRC is one of the countries with the worst bandwidth in the world, I do not think that digital technology has made a big difference for us. 

If we talk globally, then the answer is a clear Yes. 

Digital Technology along with the increase of available bandwidth has made video distribution completely viable via Internet. For sure, there are still compression issues but things are improving fast. 

As a matter of fact, I remember that some months ago a Linkedin group of video editors hosted a video clip-editing contest. They uploaded the raw material to a server and all the editors who wanted to participate downloaded the images and then submited its final cut. That was really unimaginable some years ago.

9). What is the attitude of your superiors towards digital technology? 

Do they understand how it is changing the global media landscape?

In my current job, my superior is basically the Director of the Division. So, the answer is a big NO. In the 5 years I have spent in PID, there has not been even one director of PID who really knows about video. 

Actually, some of them still think “video” as the guy who methodically films the handshakes and photo ops for archival purposes only. 

Most of the director of PID do not even understand what is editing, or what means is newsy, what is a news cycle or what is a good shot and a bad shot, etc.

So, at that primitive level, to ask if they are aware of how the digital technology is affecting the global media landscape is like asking my dog Pablo about quantum mechanics. Pablo will bark with no idea at all about the real meaning of the question…

1o). How do you finance your productions? Are you employing the Internet?

I have started a documentary some months ago and until now my film partner and me are putting our own money. Although we have a backup to raise some more money later if needed. That will be www.kickstart.org where people can post their projects and ask for donations to reach a target amount of money. For what I have seen, kickstart really works.

11). Finally, what are your own views on the future of digital documentary?

By digital documentary we should include “any kind of documentary film that has been shot with digital technology”. That will go from shooting with a cellphone camera or with a RED camera. So, the scope is huge and every camera will have the spotlight for a specific kind of situation. 

Every year is getting easier to do a documentary with a high quality image, in terms of resolution, for less money. This is a huge game changer because anybody can film a good documentary even with a cellphone video camera like the director of “Searching for Sugar Man” who shot some sequences like that. 

When the Canon 5d appeared on the market and the revolution of DSLRs started, it looked like DSLRs were going to be the new standard. Some months later, filmmakers realized that the DSLRs were not going to overthrow some big money cameras in all types of productions. So, the DSLR “look” started to develop a niche in the market. It was regarded as a specific “look”, very good and inexpensive but not the best of the best. 

Later, with cameras like the RED and SCARLET securing its position of the market and with the invasion of other DSLRs hybrids like the Panasonic AF100, Sony FS100, Canon C300 or Blackmagic Cinema, we understood that the DSLR “look” was turning into something more than a niche. Actually, now DSLRs and hybrid DSLRs are mostly used by:

• Small to medium size production houses around the world to produce everything from web videos to wedding videos, TV spots, documentaries and TV series.
• Independent filmmakers doing fiction films, documentaries or video clips.
• Big Companies trying to reduce costs in production or trying to experiment with a specific “look”.
• One-man video journalists that can take still pictures and shoot video at the same time while keeping a high quality in both areas. This was impossible with ENG cameras that were not the best, ergonomically and technically, to take still pictures. Now a one-man video journalist can use the same camera to take video or stills while keeping a shallow depth of focus or changing lenses according to the situation.

All in all, those who have come from normal camcorders with a one fixed lens in the camera and have arrived to the world of DSLRs, where you can change lenses as you need (and most of the time you must change lenses) are the ones who have benefited the most. 

This is huge because it has obliged a cameramen to learn by heart the basics of photography: F-stop, shutter speed, ISO, focal distances, etc.

And that makes a big difference in the quality of images we can obtain. Before DSLRs, for most of cameraman not related to film or still photo but mostly video, there was a camera with one fixed zoom video lens and although some of those camcorders had ISO (gain), Shutter speed and F-stop (Iris) controls, the difference those controls made on the final image were not as noticeable as in a DSLR. In a DSLR you can have proper shallow depth of field easily, something you can get in a normal video camcorder only with a lot of work and will never look as good as on a DSLR.

Also, the quality of the lenses you can attach to a DSLR, makes a big difference. In the traditional camcorders, the race for better glass did not exist because the lens was fixed there, you could not change it. So, manufacturing companies did not care much.

Finally, I know that some cameramen that learned with traditional camcorders feel that is really too much work to shoot a documentary on a DSLR but that, from my point of view, its just being lazy. 

DSLRs have close the gap between digital video recording and films not because of the quality but because DSLRs have forced us to approach filming the proper way: knowing focal distances by heart, understanding ISOs, understanding F-stops, etc.

Somehow, DSLRs have returned the soul to video digital recording!!!

Indeed, the future is bright.

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